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COMMENT
INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS: AFTERMATH OF THE FOX
DECISION AND THE YEAR 2000
Karen Ferguson*
L Introduction
The ongoing Indian fishing rights debate in northern Michigan is
intensifying as a 1985 court ordered consent agreement nears its year 2000
expiration date.' Many of the local citizenry are concerned that the debate
may turn violent as it did in the 1970s.2 In the 1970s there was fierce
competition between Indians and non-Indians over a fish resource that was
becoming depleted at an alarming rate.' While pollution of the Great Lakes
and the presence of non-native parasites were more likely the cause of the
depleted stocks, the sport fishermen blamed Indian gill netting for the
problem.4 In recent years, Indians have continually pressed for expanded gill
net fishing grounds and for a higher share of the fish harvest.' The Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) wants to be able to manage and
protect the state's natural resources for the benefit of all the people in the
state. Sport fishermen claim that the Indians will destroy the sport fishery.6
The Indians are offended by the sport fishermen's assertions that Indians are
responsible for the decimation of the fish resource and by the sport
fisherman's lack of respect for their fishing rights which have been guaranteed
to them by the treaties and affirmed by numerous court decisions.7
* Research Associate, Olson, Noonan, Urso, & Ringsmuter, P.C. J.D. cum laude, 1998,
Thomas M. Cooley Law School. The author served on the Thomas M. Cooley Law Review and
the Practical and Clinical Law Journal. She is admitted to the practice of Law in Michigan.
The law firm practices environmental and land use law.
I. Diane Conners, Fishing Debate Renews Tension of Years Past, TRAVERSE CrrY RECORD
EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Feb. 2, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Fishing Debate].
2. A Timeline of Fisheries in the Region, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City,
Mich.), Feb. 2, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Timeline].
3. Id.
4. Fishing Debate, supra note 1, at Al; Timeline, supra note 2, at A4. In the 1960s and
1970s the Great Lakes experienced high levels of pollution caused by the presence of toxic
chemical and phosphorous. Id Advisories were issued warning of the health dangers of eating
Great Lakes fish. Id Sea Lamprey, a non-native parasite, was responsible for killing off large
numbers of fish. Id.
5. See Fishing Debate, supra note 1, at Al.
6. Id.
7. William Rastetter, There's No Basis for the Claim of Salmon Depletion in Grand Traverse
Bay, TRAVERSE Criy RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Sept. 28, 1997.
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The IvIDNR hopes to have the new agreement in place by 1998 or 1999,8
but is concerned that current controversies initiated by the Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians have diverted efforts away from the
negotiation process.' The Director of the MDNR plans to address concerns
of sport fishermen but will not abide by any plan to disregard the treaties."0
Whether these parties with their divergent interests will be able to negotiate
a year 2000 agreement remains to be seen. But, as the Director aptly
commented, this year 2000 deadline "is coming like a freight train.""
Without an agreement in place many fear the resurgence of the social unrest
and violence of the 1970s." One sports writer commented that he is now
hearing many comments reminiscent of that time when sport fishermen
threatened Indians, tore up their boats and talked of beating up Indians. 3
Part II of this comment examines the process courts use to interpret treaties
in order to determine whether Indians have reserved treaty fishing rights. This
process of treaty construction involves a historical review of aboriginal title,
the cultural and religious significance of fishing rights, and court cases that
have dealt with various Indian fishing rights issues. Court cases in Michigan
have relied on the reasoning and holdings of court cases concerning fishing
controversies in the State of Washington and the State of Wisconsin. Parts I,
IV, and V provide an in depth review of court decisions regarding Indian
fishing rights in the States of Washington, Wisconsin, and Michigan
respectively. Part VI describes controversies and litigation in Michigan that
followed the momentous United States district court's decision in United
States v. Michigan,4 also known as the Fox decision. The discussion focuses
on the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. Part VII
provides a critical discourse concerning the courts' use of the canons of treaty
interpretation and the arguments brought by the parties involved in the current
controversies in Michigan. It also discusses many of the obstacles that must
be overcome in order to reach an agreement for the year 2000. One of these
obstacles concerns the expansion of the Indian's sovereign rights of
8. Diane Conners, Cool: New FishingAgreement Coming, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE
(Traverse City, Mich.), July 16, 1997, at Al [hereinafter New Fishing Agreement Coming].
9. Brief in Support of the State of Michigan's Motion to Enforce Paragraph 22 of the 1985
Consent Order and for an Expedited Hearing and for an Expedited Hearing on the Motion to
Enforce the State's Previous Informational Filing Regarding Paragraph 22 of the 1985 Consent
Order at 8, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26 (W.D. Mich. filed Aug. 29, 1997).
10. New Fishing Agreement Coming, supra note 8, at Al.
11. Id.
12. Fishing Debate, supra note 1, at Al.
13. hi.
14. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), stay denied, 505 F.
Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1980), remanded, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980), modified, 653 F.2d 277




subsistence into other areas such as inland hunting and fishing. Part VIII
concludes this comment.
The purpose of the comment is to further the "doctrinal literacy" of Indian
fishing rights. As Professor Pommersheim suggested, literacy will open the
way towards solving many of the current misunderstandings over Indian rights
issues. 5 "When there is no basic doctrinal literacy or cultural empathy, there
is no hope that any decisions [by courts affecting the parties or agreements
reached between the parties] will adequately resolve the problem."16
II. History of Treaty Fishing Rights
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a
part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise
of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were
not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed.7
There has been a long history of violent disputes over Indian fishing rights.
Perhaps the disputes are spurred on by the same passions that once motivated
the "land hungry white settlers" to push the Indians onto reservations and then
advocated their removal to west of the Mississippi. These passions now are
targeted on either the elimination or severe restriction of Indian fishing rights.
Perhaps, this tension over fishing rights may more magnanimously be
explained by a lack of understanding of the history of settlement in the United
States, the promises explicitly and implicitly made by our forefathers, and of
Indian history and culture. In other words, the non-Indians want the dispute
resolved without reference to the past. Sport fishermen, in particular, seem to
argue that placing a historical context on the debate is unfair. Indians and
non-Indians alike are all "native Americans" and all are citizens of the United
States. 8 Therefore, hunting and fishing laws should be applied equally to
all. 9 Without placing the debate into a historical context, it might appear that
Indians are being given unwarranted "super powers" over fisheries.' But
contrary to the sport fishermen's view, history cannot be eradicated as it goes
to the very essence of the court's review to determine fishing rights.
15. Professor Frank Pommersheim, Remarks at the Indian Law Symposium Sponsored by
Thomas M. Cooley Law Review and the Michigan Indian Law Center (Nov. 4, 1997).
16. Id.
17. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
18. Ric Zehner, Instead of Fishing Rights, It's Discrimination By Feds, TRAVERSE CITY
RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Sept. 7, 1997, at E12. The author of this forum piece was
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A. Aboriginal Title
The Doctrine of Discovery was the principle European nations used to
acquire and settle new lands in North America.2' Discovery gave exclusive
title to the discovering nation and the exclusive right to extinguish Indian title
and grant the soil for settlement.' The rights of the Indians were impaired,
leaving them with the right to occupy the soil, but no right to dispose of the
soil. 'thus Indians had a right of occupancy that has also been called title
of occupancy, aboriginal title, or Indian title.' But ultimate title vested first
in the discovering nation, then later in the original states and finally in the
United StatesO Aboriginal title or Indian title "was recognized and
extinguishable only by agreement with the tribes with the consent of the
United States."' Treaties were used to legally extinguish aboriginal title in
exchange for protection, goods and money."
The process of interpreting treaties to determine the scope of Indian fishing
rights must fit within the "[c]onceptual framework" that Indians granted vast
areas of aboriginal lands and other valuable rights to the United States." The
common misconception is that the United States granted lands and rights to
the Indians.' Rights not specifically granted by the Indians were reserved."
The grant must be narrowly construed because of the unique guardian/ward
relationship between the United States and the Indians created from its
obligation to protect the Indians.31 Special rules to construe these treaties are
discussed next.
B. Canons of Treaty Interpretation
In order to determine what rights the Indian people have to fish, the courts
will consider the treaties themselves as well as the circumstances surrounding
the treaties.32 The first step in the inquiry into fishing rights is whether the
treaty establishing the reservation reserved fishing rights.33 If the treaty did
21. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823).
22. Id at 586-88.
23. Id at 591.
24. See CHARLEs F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 39 (1987).
25. Id (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)).
26. WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 41 (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,
665 (1979)).
27. KIRKE KICKINGBIRD, ur AL., INDIAN TREATIEs 12 (1980).
28. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 254 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
29. 'United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
30. Id
31. 'United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 254. This guardian/ward relationship is the
result of the Indian tribes' unique status as domestic dependent nations rather than foreign nations.
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17, 40 (1831).
32. KICKiNGBIRD, supra note 27, at 32.




not specifically mention fishing rights or the language was ambiguous, then
the second step is to look at the circumstances surrounding the signing of the
treaty, the Indian customs and practices before and after the signing of the
treaty, the intent of the parties, and the documentation of treaty
negotiations. 4 If as a result of the inquiry in steps one or two it is
determined that the Indians had a right to fish, then the final step involves a
review of "subsequent Acts, statutes, and agreements to determine if, from
their very terms or by surrounding circumstances, they have diminished or
abrogated the original rights as guaranteed by the treaty."3
Courts apply different canons of construction to different types of treaties
to interpret their meaning?6 For example, principles of statutory construction
may be used to interpret treaties that are legislative in nature, and contract
principles are often used to interpret treaties that are contractual in nature.37
The canons of international treaty interpretation are (1) interpretation of the
treaty's text,38 (2) liberal construction of treaties to carry out the apparent
contractual intent of independent nations to "secure equality and reciprocity
between them,"39 and (3) interpretation of the intent of the parties.'
Yet, application of contract principles may be inadequate to determine the
understanding of the parties, unless those parties had equal bargaining
power.4 The circumstances under which the treaties were negotiated with the
Indians was described in the following manner:
Aboriginal Spiritual Belief System. The Effect of European Contact and the Continuing Fight to
Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. L. R-v. 377, 404 (1989).
34. l
35. Id. at 405.
36. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953,
963 (1994).
37. Id. "A treaty is not only a law but also a contract between two nations and (it) must, if
possible be construed to give full force and effect to all its parts." See KICKINGBIRD, supra note
27, at 6 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1674 (4th ed. 1951)).
38. Bederman, supra note 36, at 963.
39. l at 966.
40. Id. at 970. The author suggests that this canon was transformed by Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). Choctaw allowed courts to consider sources external to the
treaty when interpreting the intent of the parties. Id. The Court intended that the Choctaw Nation
interpretative method would be applied to international treaties as well as Indian treaties. Id. at
970 n.77. However, with Indian treaties the intent of the Indians is given deference over the
intent of the United States. See KICKINGBIRD, supra note 27, at 33.
41. See Bederman, supra note 36, at 963. But see Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). In Washington Fishing Vessel,
the United States Supreme Court likened a treaty to a contract between two sovereign nations.
Id. at 675. "When the signatory nations have not been at war and neither is the vanquished, it
is reasonable to assume that they negotiated as equals at arm's length. There is no reason to doubt
that this assumption applies to the treaty at issue here." Id But, the Court goes on to explain that
where one party is superior, it has the duty not to take advantage of the weaker party. Id. at 675-
76. Thus, treaties must be construed as the Indians would have understood them at the time of
the signing. Id. (relying on Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
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negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United
States, an enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives
skilled in diplomacy, masters of a written language, understanding
the modes and forms of creating the various technical estates
known to their law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by
themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by them in their own
language; that the Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and
dependent people, who have no written language and are wholly
unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose only
knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is framed is that
imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United
States 2
Because of this lack of equality in negotiations between the Indian tribes and
the United States, the United States Supreme Court developed a different set
of canons that give deference to the Indians.43 These canons ensure that "the
language used in treaties with the Indians shall never be construed to their
prejudice."'
First, these treaties shall be interpreted "as the Indians would have
understood them."'45 The words of the treaty are to be given meaning as
"understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning.'46
Words in international treaties, on the other hand, are given their ordinary
meaning as understood under the law of nations. 7
Second, "[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indian
parties."'48 Since treaties were written in English, not in the native language
of the Indians, and interpreters who were employed by the United States
government explained the treaties, any ambiguities are interpreted from the
standpoint of the Indians.49 Where two inferences could be drawn from the
language of the treaty, the inference that would support rather than defeat the
purpose of the Indians and the United States must be chosen.' "Only the
42. KiCKINGBIRD, supra note 27, at 33 (quoting Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1899)).
43. The canons of treaty construction were a direct result of the circumstances under which
treaties were negotiated. "The Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and agree upon
an exchange of lands in an arm's-length transaction. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and
they had no choice but to consent." United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 252 (W.D.
Mich. 1979) (citing Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970)).
44. KICKINGBIRD, supra note 27, at 32 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (6
Pet.) (1832)).
45. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 249.
46. Id. (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (1886); United States v.
Winans 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
47. Bederman, supra note 36, at 966-67 & nn.59-60.
48. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 251.
49. See id. at 252.




clearest language depriving Indians of the rights which they had prior to the
treaties will limit their rights today."5'
Third, Indian treaties must be "construed liberally in favor of the
Indians."'  Under this canon treaties are construed more liberally than a
contract or agreement between private parties. 3 Narrow interpretation is
inappropriate where "friendly and dependent Indians are likely to accept
without discriminating scrutiny the terms proposed."'
Application of these canons of construction allow consideration of
nontextual sources such as the history of the treaty, the negotiations, treaty
minutes, oral versions of the treaty, and the practice of the parties.5 Words
in a treaty or agreement must be given meaning by considering them in
"connection with the entire scheme of the agreement as framed, including
those parts not finally adopted, as throwing light on the meaning of the
remainder."' "How the treaty in question was understood may be gathered
from the circumstances."" Thus, arguably, the real basis for determining the
nature of Indian fishing rights is "Indian practice, running from time
immemorial, of fishing in [particular] locations as a means of livelihood.""8
C. Cultural Significance of Fishing Rights
Fishing was not only important to Indians for subsistence living, but it was
culturally and religiously significant to them as well. Indians lived in harmony
the United States brought suit on behalf of the Indians to determine whether the Indians had
reserved water rights. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 88-89 (2d ed. 1988).
Settlers, who had diverted a stream running through Indian reserved lands, argued that lands
would not have been ceded without rights to water allowing for productive use of the land. Id.
at 89. The United States, on behalf of the Indians, argued that Indians would not have reserved
lands without reserving water allowing for productive use of the reservation. Id. Faced with two
contradictory meanings and no clear language in the treaty for guidance, the Court chose the
meaning most favorable to the Indians. Id.
51. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 252 (citing Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968)).
52. Id. at 251 (citing Choctaw Nations of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1943)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 250 (citing United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938)).
55. See id.; see also KICKINGBIRD, supra note 27, at 32, 34 (explaining that treaty minutes
of the treaty council "provide important information about the motives, concerns and perceptions
of the parties to a treaty.... and may substantiate the Indian's oral version of the treaty ... [or]
show examples of misunderstanding, lack of good faith or even fraud on the part of the
government commissioners").
56. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 569 (1883).
57. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 250 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
58. Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States
Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 207, 209 (1972); FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 442 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S
HANDBOOK 1982 ED.] (explaining that aboriginal rights to hunt and fish are based on immemorial
custom and practice).
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with nature, feeling a "genuine respect for other life forms." 9 "Indians
perceived man and nature as tripartite beings consisting of body, soul, and
shadow."' The relationship between man and nature was interdependent and
was infused with spiritual and mystical beliefs.' "In the creation myth of the
indigenous Indians, all of Nature's bounty was once related to mankind."'
The Great Spirit, Kitchi Manitou, was the creator and sustainer of all things
and was the power or force that made "everything in Nature alive and
responsive to man."' For successful hunting and fishing Indians had to
comply with the strict and complex rules that were part of their belief
system:' Catastrophe could result if either man or nature failed in their
mutual obligation to obediently follow these prescribed rules.' While
nature's oblightion was to surrender up life forms, such as fish, to the Indian
to satisfy his needs, the Indians' concomitant obligation to nature was to
refrain from abuse of its bounty.' If the Indians abused nature, the spirits
of the species would be offended and would inflict disease and scarcity of the
species upon them.'
When Europeans came they brought diseases which Indians had not
previously been exposed to and from which they had no immunity."
Unbeknownst to the Indians this disease was not brought upon them by the
spirits.!' Not comprehending why compliance with Indian rituals no longer
worked, the Indians retaliated against nature by ravaging its wildlife. Not only
59. Turner, supra note 33, at 377.
60. rd. at 380.
61. a .at 377.
62. Id. at 379. This relationship is illustrated by Chipewyan legend:
woman was the first human being. In her nocturnal dreams she imagined herself
sleeping With a handsome youth, who was in reality her pet dog transformed. One
day a giant appeared in the land. With mighty strokes he shaped the rough-hewn
landscape into lakes and rivers and mountains - all the landforms we know
tcday. Then he stooped down and caught up the dog, "and tore it to pieces; the
guts he threw into the lakes and rivers, commanding them to become the different
kind of fish; the flesh he dispersed over the land, commanding it to become
different kinds of beasts and land-animals; the skin he also tore into small pieces,
and threw it into the air, commanding it to become all kinds of birds; after which
hes gave the woman and her offspring full power to kill, eat, and never spare, for
that he had commanded them to multiple for her use in abundance.
Id. (citing CALVIN MARTIN, KEEPERS OF THE GAME 186 (1978) which quoted excerpts from the
journal of SAMUEL HEARNE, A JOURNEY FROM PRINCE OF WALE'S FORT IN HUDSON'S BAY To
THE NoRTHERN OCEAN 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, at 219-20 (1795) (R. Glover ed. 1958)).
63. Id. at 379 & n.7.
64. l d at 381.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 382.
67. Id at 383.
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did the Europeans unintentionally upset the balance in this relationship
between the Indians and nature, but they sought to replace the Indian's
religious beliefs with Christianity." Notwithstanding the influence of white
settlers on the Indian belief system, Indians continue to tenaciously cling to
their aboriginal right to fish. This is true even for tribes who have gone
beyond subsistence living and have found wealth by other means, such as
gaming casinos."
This tenaciousness may be difficult for non-Indians to understand. Perhaps,
it is an effort to retain a sense of their ancestors who, from the time man
crossed the Bering Strait thousands of years ago, hunted and fished - to
retain in their present culture the vitality of the spiritual and mystical belief
system of their ancestors.' For some tribes that alienated most of their lands,
fishing today provides a "sense of community and identity.., and a symbol
of the group's cultural cohesiveness."' Indian claims to treaty fishing rights
represent "a move toward a renewal of an embattled aspect of traditional life."
Indians, seeking to establish fishing rights by challenging limitations to fishing
rights and battling for more control over fishing, are only attempting to
reassert their ethnic identity7
D. The Indian Treaty Right to Fish
Indians generally have on-reservation fishing rights regardless of whether
or not the treaty expressly reserved these rights." For example, the
Menominee Tribe ceded lands in Wisconsin in exchange for the Wolf River
Reservation." The treaty language specified that this reservation was "for a
home, to be held as Indian lands are held."' In Menominee Tribe of Indians
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court construed this ambiguous
language in the Treaty of Wolf River favorably to the Menominees and
determined that the right to fish was included.' The Court also held that
70. Id. at 387-88.
71. The Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa and Ottawa Indians involved in a current fishing
rights controversy in Northern Michigan has two gambling casinos, the Leelanau Sands Casino
and the Turtle Creek casino.
72. See Turner, supra note 33, at 378, 423.
73. Michael R. Anderson, Law and the Protection of Cultural Communities: The Case of
Native American Fishing Rights, LAW & PoL'Y 125, 130 (1987). Salmon fishing was a "powerful
symbol of cultural identity" to the Puyallup and Nisqually, both tribes having alienated most of
their lands. Id.
74. Id. at 129-31.
75. DAviD H. GET-c Es, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 850 (3d. ed. 1993)
(referring to Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)).
76. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1968).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 413.
It would seem unlikely that the Menominees would have knowingly relinquished
their special fishing and hunting rights which they enjoyed on their own lands, and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
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those fishing rights were not abrogated by the Termination Act of 19541
Furthermore, Menominee Tribe of Indians established that on-reservation
fishing rights were not subject to state hunting and fishing regulations.'
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the tribe's authority to regulate fishing by Indians on the
reservation.81 In addition, the Court rejected the State's argument that state
regulation should apply to non-Indians fishing on the reservation.' State
jurisdiction to regulate on-reservation fishing is only justified if the state
provides some function or services in connection with the on-reservation
fishing.' The state in this case failed to demonstrate that it provided any
such function or service or that there was any off-reservation effect that would
warrant concurrent state regulation.' Thus, "[a] federal treaty, statute, or
agreement setting aside a reservation for the use and occupation of a tribe is
necessarily preemptive of state jurisdiction over Indian hunting and fishing
activity on the reservation."'
While it is clear that Indians have the right to fish on the reservation and
to regulate that fishing, it may not be clear whether traditional fishing grounds
are part of the reservation or not. For example, in People v. Jondreau, a
Chippewa fisherman was arrested for fishing in Lake Superior in violation of
state law.98 The 1854 Treaty with the Chippewa set out the boundaries of the
reservation.' If the boundaries of the reservation were extended into the
lake, the fisherman would have been fishing on the reservation and not subject
to state regulation.' The Michigan Supreme Court rejected arguments that
the State had the authority to regulate because it had title to the submerged
lands and because under Michigan Law, township boundaries did not extend
into the Great Lakes." Instead, the court interpreted the treaty as the
Chippewa would have understood it.9  The Indians would not have
have accepted in exchange other lands with respect to which such rights did not
extend. They undoubtedly believed that these rights were guaranteed to them when
these other lands were ceded to them "to be held as Indians lands are held."
Id. at 406 n.2 (quoting State v. Sanapaw, 124 N.W.2d 41,44 (Wis. 1963)).
79. Id. at 408 (explaining that the Termination Act provided for the "'orderly termination of
Federal supervision over the property and members' of the tribe").
80. Id.
81. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983).
82. [d. at 338-44.
83. Id. at 341.
84. Id. at 341-43.
85. Turner, supra note 33, at 404 (quoting Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711
F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1983)).
86. People v. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d 375, 376-77 (Mich. 1971).
87. Id. (citing article 2 of the Treaty with the Chippewas of 1854, 10 Stat. 1109, 1109-10).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 377.




understood the concept of municipal boundaries, but because they lived on
lands bordering on the waters of the Great Lakes they would have assumed
that the treaty right to fish would include the right to fish in those waters."
If the Indians also claim off-reservation fishing, then the treaty must be
construed to determine if those rights were reserved. In United Statesv.
Winans, the United States brought suit to enjoin non-Indian landowners from
obstructing Yakima Indians from exercising fishing rights on the Columbia
River in Washington.' Article 3 of the Treaty with the Yakima Nation in
1859 specifically secured Indian fishing rights on the reservation as well as
the "right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with
citizens of the territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing
them.'93 The United States Supreme Court construed article 3 as the Indians
would have understood it.' The Court determined that the Indians had
reserved rights to off-reservation fishing at traditional fishing grounds and that
these reserved rights "imposed a servitude upon every piece of land,"
regardless of the fact that the non-Indians were granted a patent from the
federal government to the land and a license from the state to operate a fish
wheel."5 The Court found that the treaty language provided for the
contingency that these lands would be owned by non-Indians in the future,
and that "the Indians were given right in the [non-Indian] land, - the right
of crossing it to the river, - the right to occupy it to the extent and for the
purpose mentioned."' While Winans is heralded for establishing the Indian's
right to off-reservation fishing and providing easements to allow Indians to
exercise that right, the Court hinted at the possibility of state regulation by
opining that the state would not be unreasonably restrained from regulating
that right.'
The United States Supreme Court had another opportunity to construe the
language in article 3 of the Treaty of 1859 with the Yakima Nation. In Tulee
v. Washington, a member of the Yakima tribe of Indians was convicted of
91. idt at 378.
92. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
93. Id. at 378 (citing Treaty Between the United States and the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (June
9, 1855) (ratified in 1859)).
94. Id. at 380.
95. l at 381-82.
96. Id. at 381.
97. Johnson, supra note 58, at 220-21. The author argues that precedent establishing the
state's right to regulate fishing is based on this dicta in Winans, and dicta in Ward v. Race Horse,
163 U.S. 504 (1896) which has been relied on for the proposition that hunting regulations applied
to Indians exercising their rights to hunt off the reservation. Id. at 220. He contends this has been
a major United States Supreme Court error as Race Horse applied only when tribal hunting rights
were terminated and Indians became subject to state regulation as there was no longer tribal
regulation of fishing. Id. Also, the decision in Winans had nothing to do with state regulation,
and any reference to it was unnecessary to the decision. Id. at 221.
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catching salmon without a state fishing license.98 The State argued that the
treaty should not limit its right to regulate fishing on non-Indian lands as the
regulations were nondiscriminatory, applying equally to Indians and non-
Indians 19 The appellant argued that he had the right under the treaty to
unrestricted fishing in the '"usual and accustomed places' free from state
regulation of any kind."'' The Court, impressed with the strong desire of
the Indians to retain their fishing rights, construed the treaty language in the
"spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect
the interests of dependent people."'' Interpreting the treaty in this light, the
Court found that the statute imposing a fishing license fee on Indians was
invalid."
While the decision in Tulee affirmed the Indian's right to off-reservation
fishing without a state imposed fee, the Court again commented in dicta on
the possibility of state regulation."u Regulation concerning the "time and
manner" of off-reservation fishing could be imposed equally ("in common")
on Indians and non-Indians if necessary for the conservation of fish."'
Professor Ralph W. Johnson, in The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation
Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, pointed out that later decisions
have relied on Winans and Tulee to support state regulation of off-reservation
Indian fishing rights." This was done without the application of the canons
of treaty construction."° Despite the United States Supreme Court decisions,
the State of Washington refused to recognize Indian fishing rights. The
situation became very contentious and resulted in years of litigation.
11. Fishing Rights Controversy in Washington
When you came to our lands seeking 'freedom" you were given
this and more and you took - never giving.
Our Lands were pure and strong with plenty for all who lived
in harmony. Today-we see all that is around us is suffering -
our waters, our blood polluted, our fish, our strength weakened,
our air bringing sickness, our mother earth and our women
becoming barren.
98. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 682 (1942).
99. L. at 683-84.
100. Id. at 684.
101. Id. at 684-85.
102. Ld. at 685.
103. Johnson, supra note 58, at 221.
104. l. (pointing out that again the Court's reference to state regulation of "time and
manner" of fishing was not necessary to the decision of whether the state had authority to charge
Indians a license fee for the right to fish).
105. See id.




As the natural fish become overpowered by the unnatural fish,
so it is with the natural people. We ask you to stop for the sake
of all unborn. We ask your respect."
The State of Washington continued to assert its authority to regulate Indian
off-reservation fishing with the justification that it was "indispensable" to the
State's scheme of regulation."H The Nisqually, Puyallup, and Muckleshoot
staged Fish-Ins to defy this regulation."°  The State arrested several
protestors for violation of state fishing regulations."' In 1965, violence
erupted when Indian fishers attempted to put a canoe in the water at a fishing
landing."' Thirty-five or more state fishing wardens using "Gestapo police-
state tactics" attacked eight unarmed Indian men and nineteen women and
children."' Notwithstanding a 1969 United States Supreme Court's decision
in Sohappy v. Smith upholding Indian fishing rights in Oregon, Washington
continued to disregard these rights."' In 1970, "state and local police
stormed an Indian fishing camp on the Puyallup River and teargassed the
people, arrested dozens of Indians and their supporters, and bull-dozed the
camp away." The state's disregard for Indian fishing rights encouraged acts
of violence of non-Indian sport fishers as well."4
The Fish-In demonstrations were characterized as "a defense of the whole
'Indian Way' as well as a defense of fishing rights." 5 Fish-Ins were
107. NATIVE AMERICAN SOLIDARITY COMM., To FISH IN COMMON (1978) [hereinafter To
FISH IN COMMON], reprinted in 4 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AMERICAN INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
646, 653 (1978) [hereinafter HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS].
108. GETCHES, supra note 75, at 864; Anderson, supra note 73, at 131.
109. Anderson, supra note 73, at 131.
110. Id.
11. To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS,
supra note 107, at 653. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was a temporary, independent,
bipartisan agency that was established by Congress in 1957. The commission's purpose was to
collect information, to serve as a clearing house for information, and to study legal developments
that constituted a denial of equal protection because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, or in administration of justice.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 662-63.
114. Id. at 662. "[S]portsmen began raiding one Indian camp after another. They sank
fishing boats, stole and destroyed Indian nets, took pot-shots at Indians, and harassed and
threatened Indian families on their own land." Id.
115. Anderson, supra note 73, at 132. The Fish-In protest was more than an assertion of
fishing rights:
Fishing was a part of tribal life. If we didn't do something the tribes would be
destroyed. They knew it. We knew the odds were against us.... The State of
Washington is attempting to deprive us of our fishing rights, using illegal
chicanery, political-minded judges and militant Nazi-like Game and Fisheries
Department as weapons against us.... Up until now we've reached a point where
it's life or death for the Indian culture, and we've decided to take the offensive.
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successful in bringing the issue to the forefront, but they were unsuccessful
in gaining any respect for Indian fishing rights from the state or non-Indian
fishers. The Indians were forced to pursue their battle one step further, in the
courts. In 1967, with the assistance of the NAACP and the pan-Indian
movement, the Puyallup tribe was able to bring a case arising from the Fish-
In arrests before the United State Supreme Court. 16 In addition, responding
to pressure from the Indians, the United States in 1970 brought legal action
on behalf of several tribes, United States v. Washington, against the State of
Washington to protect Indian fishing rights consistent with the Sohappy
117decision.
In the Fish-In case, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup I),
the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Treaty of Medicine Creek to
ascertain the meaning of the language "[tjhe right of taking fish, at all the
usual and accustomed grounds and stations."' . Even though the Court found
from the circumstances existing when the treaty was signed that fishing with
nets was customary, neither the "manner" or modes of fishing nor the purpose
for fishing, whether or not it was commercial, was reserved by the treaty."'
In addition, the Court construed the "in common with all citizens of the
Territory" to mean that fishing by both Indian and non-Indians alike was
subject to state regulation." Thus, the manner, size of fish, and commercial
fishing may be regulated in the interest of conservation as long as it does not
discriminate against the Indians.' But, if the use of nets to capture fish was
not a necessary conservation measure, then the Puyallup's use of such nets
would not be in violation of state regulations.'" While the decision affirmed
Indian rights to fish off-reservation at the "usual and accustomed" fishing
grounds, the decision was a disappointment to Indians seeking to enhance
self-determination.' "
In Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), the United States
Supreme Court found that the State's determination that fishing nets be banned
as "necessary" to the conservation of the fish discriminated against the
Indians."u "There [was] discrimination here because all Indian net fishing
[was] barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely preempted by non-
Id. (quoting STAN STEINER, THE NEW INDIANS 52, 54, 62 (1968)).
116. Id. (referring to Puyallup v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup 1)).
117. To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS,
supra note 107, at 663 (referring to United States v. Washington, 384, F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975)).
118. Puyallup 1, at 395 (construing Treaty Of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854)).
119. Id. at 398.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id. at 402-03.
123. Anderson, supra note 73, at 132.




Indians, is allowed."'" But, the Court cautioned the Indians by making an
often quoted limitation to treaty fishing rights: "the Treaty does not give the
Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their
nets.""
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup III)'" was decided after
a lower court held that the Puyallup reservation had not been extinguished
after all." The challenged state regulation was now over on-reservation
fishing.'" Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, refused to upset
state regulations protecting the fisheries, even though the Treaty expressly
reserved on-reservation fishing rights.'30 The state's limitation on Indian
steelhead catch was found to be a proper standard, necessary for conservation
of the fish resource; and even though the tribe was not required to provide the
state with information on tribal fishers and the size of their catch, it was
probably in the fishers interest for the tribe to provide the information.'
Because of the State's denial of Indian treaty fishing rights and the
"deterioration of the salmon and steelhead runs and habitat," the Indians
pressured the United States to bring an action against the State in United
States v. Washington.' Indians not only protested that state regulation of
Indian fishing violated their sovereign right to self-determination, but also,
that state regulation allowed for over fishing by non-Indians and poor hatchery
practices.' Additionally, the fisheries were being destroyed by energy
development, logging practices, and industrial and farming pollution." With
the fisheries destroyed before reaching Indian fishing places, the Indians were
left with no harvestable fish. 35
Judge Boldt hoped that the court's decision in United States v. Washington
would "finally settle... the divisive problems of treaty right fishing which
for so long have plagued the citizens of this area."'" The court, with the
assistance of testimony and reports provided by anthropologists, interpreted
the treaty language "[t]he right of taking fish at all the usual and accustomed
grounds" and share "in common with all citizens of the Territory" to mean
125. Id. at 48.
126. Id. at 49.
127. Puyallup v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup II1).
128. GErcnEs, supra note 75, at 868 (citing United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 869.
131. Puyallup III, 433 U.S. at 172-73.
132. To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARiNG ON FISHING RIGHTS,
supra note 107, at 669.
133. Id. at 649, 664-69.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 673.
136. Anderson, supra note 73, at 133 (quoting United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 330 (W.D. Wash. 1974)).
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that Indians had the right to take up to 50% of the harvestable fish at the
usual and accustomed place.137 Consequently, the Indians had more than a
right to "cast a fishing line" along with the thousands of non-Indians who now
fish in the area, and more than an "equal opportunity to take fish."''
Instead, the Indians had a right to a certain percentage of the catch, and the
state had an obligation to prevent non-Indians from taking more than their
50% share.'39
The court also held that the State of Washington's existing fishing
regulations violated the Indians' fishing rights as they exceeded what was
necessary for the conservation of the fish resource."4 In order to subject
Indians to state regulation, the State must show that the conservation objective
is to perpetuate the run or fish species and that object cannot be accomplished
by applying the restriction solely to non-Indian fishers. 4' Additionally, state
regulations must not discriminate against the Indians. The decision also
enhanced tribal self-determination by establishing that tribes meeting certain
qualifications may regulate Indian treaty fishing free from state regulation.'43
Finally, the court required the state and tribes to co-manage the
fisheries." Because recalcitrant State officials and their non-Indian
commercial and sports fishing allies obstinately refused to recognize Indian
fishing rights, the district court retained jurisdiction to scrutinize all future
137. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 342-43, 402, 416-17. This right to 50%
of harvestable fish was not just a right to take 50% of the fish that made it upstream to Indian
fishing grounds from downstream non-Indian fishing sites, but instead was 50% of the fish
destined for those upstream grounds regardless ofwhether they were captured downstream or in
marine waters. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975). Fish caught on
the reservation did count toward the Indian's 50% share, as on-reservation rights were not shared
in common with non-Indians. Washington v. Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 687 (1979).
138. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 185 (Norman Dorsen, ed.,
1983); set? also United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 688.
To hold that the Indian negotiators intended to secure for each member of the tribe
the right to compete for fish on equal terms as an individual with each individual
setler the state's view of the "in common with" clause as a prototype of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause thus would be to disregard the
fabric of Indian society at the time the treaties were concluded, a society of
communality whose nature was reflected in the subsequent legal character of
property ownership which evolved in Federal Indian law.
Id. (citing FELIx S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 183 (Univ. of N.M. photo.
reprint 1971) (1942)).
139. PEVAR, supra note 138, at 185.
140. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 682.
141. Id. at 683.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTs,




state regulation of Indian fishing, thus taking on the unusual role of "perpetual
fishmaster" over fishing in the State of Washington. 45
United States v. Washington has not only affirmed the Indians' right to fish
but has enabled them to exercise their culture and their sovereign right to self
determination." Despite this recognition of Indian fishing rights, non-treaty
fishers continued to fight the decision. "[L]ocal fishing groups have staged
protests, defied court orders, lobbied and campaigned to curtail the treaty
fishing rights of Native peoples."'" In an attempt to resolve the dispute a
presidential task force was appointed to investigate the dispute and negotiate
a compromise.'49 The goals of the proposed settlement plan were to (1)
establish a healthy fishery for both Indian and non-Indian commercial fishers,
(2) "establish a healthy sports fishery, (3) fulfill treaty fishing rights, and (4)
establish a fisheries management system."'50 The plan recognized that both
Indians and non-Indians had historic fishing patterns that should be
maintained.' The plan proposed management zones that replaced the
Indian's usual and accustomed fishing grounds.' "The tribes [were] not
being asked to give up their treaty rights to their usual and accustomed
ground, but instead to exercise their rights in a manner consistent with this
settlement."'"
However, the proposed settlement was rejected by the Indians because
treaty fishing rights were abrogated; officials of the State of Washington and
members of Congress failed to negotiate in good faith; and the plan failed to
address what the Indians perceived as the real problems, including state
mismanagement of the fisheries, and the refusal of State officials to recognize
and enforce treaty fishing rights established in United States v.
Washington."5 Non-Indian fishing groups were equally adamant in their
145. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 682, 693 (Bums, J., concurring).
146. To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS,
supra note 107, at 683.
147. Id. at 689.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 695.
150. REGIONAL TEAM OF THE FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON WASHINGTON STATE FISHERIES,
SETrLEMENT PLAN FOR WASHINGTON STATE SALMON AND STEELHEAD FISHERIES (1978),
reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS, supra note 107, at 57.
151. Id. at 58.
152. Id. at 59.
153. Id. at 59.
154. NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHERIES COMM'N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FORMAL RESPONSE
TO SETTLEMENT PLAN FOR WASHINGTON STATE SALMON AND STEELHEAD FISHERIES (1978),
reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS, supra note 107, at 9. Treaty rights eliminated were:
(1) traditional fishing grounds were eliminated, (2) the tribes share of up to 50% of the harvest
was reduced, (3) commercial harvesting of Steelhead was eliminated, (4) tribal regulation on- and
off-reservation was eliminated, (5) state's regulatory power over Indian fishing was expanded, (6)
treaty defense was limited, and (7) protection of fishing rights provided because of the federal
trust obligation to the Indians and because of federal court jurisdiction over state fishing
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rejection of the task force proposed settlement. One commercial fishing group
indicated that a settlement would never be forthcoming until "all fishermen
can fish, in common pursuant to equal standards."'55 This group was critical
of the task force's failure to resolve the two most "devastating factors of the
Boldt decision, the theory of multi-management of the fishery and the unfair
50% allocation.'
At the same time the task force was attempting to negotiate a settlement,
the United States Civil Rights Commission held hearings to investigate the
claims of deprivation of equal protection of the law." The Commission was
to submit its findings and recommendations for corrective action to Congress
and the President.'
The Washington State Game Department continued to refuse to comply
with the federal court decree in United States v. Washington requiring the
State to abandon its attempt to regulate Indian fishing.'59 Subsequent district
court orders were also defied." ° As a result, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.' The Court modified the
decision in United States v. Washington by its decision in Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association.' The
Court once again interpreted the "in common with" language." While
continuing to recognize that the Indians should be entitled to an equal share
of the harvest, it held that this share should be reduced to a lesser amount if
the reduced amount would provide a moderate living to the Indians.'" Thus,
the 50% figure is the maximum but a lower amount could be set."~ The
Court also upheld the district court's authority to assume direct supervision of
the fisheries if "state recalcitrance or state-law barriers should be
continued."'
Following this extensive litigation, tribes in the Pacific Northwest have
formed intertribal fisheries management agencies, the Columbia River
Intertribal Fish Commission (CRITFC) and the Northwest Indian Fisheries
regulation was substantially reduced. Id.
155. Letter from Paul L. Anderson, Executive Manger, Purse Seine Vessel Owners
Association to the Federal Task Force on Washington State Fisheries I (July 31, 1978), reprinted
in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS, supra note 107, at 603.
156. Id. at 2.
157. 3 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS, supra note 107, at 1.
158. Il
159. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 673-74 (1979).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 674.
162. See id. at 658.
163. Id. at 677-89.
164. Id. at 686-87.
165. Id.




Commission (NWIFC).'" These two tribal agencies cooperate with the State
of Washington's Department of Fisheries to manage the salmon and steelhead
fisheries.'" CRITFC reached an agreement with both the federal government
and state governments in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho to adopt a
cooperative management plan for salmon and steelhead.'"
Nevertheless, as long as the fish resource continues to be depleted from
over fishing and pollution, the controversy in the State of Washington will
continue. Bitter resentment toward the Indian fishers will persist as Indians
are perceived as having superior rights to fishing. Some Indians complain that
the Boldt decision has forced them to become big commercial fishermen in
order to compete with technology of the non-Indian fishers." One author
explained "the paradox of the Boldt decision: a legal solution designed to
strengthen cultural unity through the protection of traditional elements actually
functioned to increase divisiveness and lend support to marine fishers adhering
to more Euro-American values..'.' Similar controversies over fishing rights
in the Great Lakes have lead to years of litigation in Wisconsin and Michigan.
IV. Fishing Rights Controversy in Wisconsin
[An old lady and her grandson told the king that they would
stay and watch the grave of the king's daughter.] The King said
that that was all right.
So everybody left except for the old lady and her grandson.
The king gave them everything they asked for. They set out the
net, and the "next morning, when they went to the net, they found
it full of fish. They did that every morning, and the net was
always full.'"
167. Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights
of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 375, 406.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 407.
170. Anderson, supra note 73, at 136.
171. Id. at 139.
172. The Boy, His Grandmother, and the King's Daughter (n.d.), collected in VICTOR
BARNOUW, WISCONSIN CHIPPEWA MYTHS & TALES AND THEIR RELATION TO CHIPPEWA LIFE
175 (1977). In this tale of magical powers the king's daughter is brought back to life. In another
mystical story about a magical food supply, Wenebojo, a mythical and cultural hero and trickster,
sees a man chopping ice. He goes up to the man and the man tells him to "Take a drink of water,
if you're dry. Wenebojo drank, and there were so many little trout he swallowed some. When
Wenebojo had his fill, the fellow said to go home and not to look back, no matter what."
Wenebojo then ran back but heard voices calling after him, "Chase him! He's taking all our fish."
Then a voice told him to leave his ice pack in a hollow. He did this and left. When he saw his
wife, he said, "'Let's go see in the hollow.' When they got there, that hollow was full of trout."
Wenebojo and Madjikiwis (n.d.), collected in BARNOUW, supra, at 88.
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Three treaties were made with the Chippewa tribes living in an area which
is now the State of Wisconsin.'" In the Treaty of 1837 and the Treaty of
1842, the Chippewa ceded and sold lands to the United States in exchange for
payments, reservation lands, and reserved fishing rights in the ceded
territor.j' 4 Article 5 of the Treaty of 1837 provides that "the privilege of
hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the
lakes included in the territory ceded, is guaranteed to the Indians, during the
pleasure of the President of the United States."'75 Article 2 of the Treaty of
1842 provides that:
The Indians stipulate for the right of hunting on the ceded
territory, with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until
required to remove by the President of the United States, and that
the laws of the United States shall be continued in force, in
respect to their trade and intercourse with the whites, until
otherwise ordered by Congress.'76
In the Treaty of 1854 the Chippewa ceded lands in exchange for reservations
on lands they had ceded in the previous two treaties.'"
The Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (LCO)
brought an action, Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt (LCO I), to
challenge a decision in United States v. Bouchard'79 denying the Indians
their treaty based fishing rights. In United States v. Bouchard, District Court
Judge Doyle held that off-reservation fishing rights reserved in the treaties of
1837 and 1842 had been extinguished by the Treaty of 1854." In LCO I,
the United States Court of Appeals held that neither the President's Removal
Order of 1850 nor the Treaty of 1854 extinguished Indian off-reservation
treaty fishing rights.'' The court interpreted language in the treaties of 1837
and 1842 to mean that Indian fishing rights could only be terminated if the
Indians "misbehaved."'" Since the Chippewa had not "misbehaved," the
President had no authority to terminate those rights."' The court also
173. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 653 F.
Supp. 1420, 1425 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (LCO III).
174. See Kenneth D. Nelson, Wisconsin, Walleye, and the Supreme law of the Land: An
Overview of the Chippewa Indian Treaty Rights Dispute in Northern Wisconsin, II HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & PoLY 381, 384 (1990).
175. LCO 111, 653 F. Supp. at 1425.
176. Id. (quoting Treaty with the Chippewas, 7 Stat. 591 (1842)).
177. Id at 1426 (referring to Treaty with the Chippewas, 10 Stat. 1109 (1854)).
178. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983) (LCO 1).
179. United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1361 (W.D. Wis. 1978), rev'd, LCO I,
700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
180. LCO III, 653 F. Supp. at 1422.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1425 (referring to the decision in LCO 1).




construed the 1854 treaty language as the Chippewa would have understood
it to determine that the treaty did not abrogate fishing rights in the ceded
territory." Rather, the treaties of 1837 and 1842 guaranteed the Chippewa:
the right to make a moderate living off the land and from the
waters in and abutting the ceded territory and throughout the
ceded territory by engaging in hunting, fishing, and gathering as
they had in the past and by consuming the fruits of that hunting,
fishing, and gathering, or by trading the fruits of that activity for
goods they could use and consume in realizing that moderate
living."
LCO I was shocking to non-Indian fishers in Wisconsin. Violent and
confrontational protests and racial assaults followed as a result of the
decision." "Treaty Beer" was sold to finance litigation and lobbying to
overturn the decision." Opposition called for the abrogation of the 1837
and 1842 treaties and Indian fishing rights."u Members of Stop Treaty
Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc. (STA) subjected Chippewa members of the Lac Du
Flambeau Indians band to "stone throwing, threats of harm, racial and sexual
insults, minor batteries, and damage to their vehicles."'" The intent of STA
was to interfere with the fish harvest during spawning season by congregating
in large numbers to block landings and to harass and threaten fishers with
"threats, taunts, racial insults, obscene comments, air raid sirens, whistles, and
derogatory songs and chants.' 
19 °
While recognizing treaty off-reservation fishing rights, the court of appeals
in LCO I found that the Chippewa's understanding when the treaty was signed
was that the exercise of these rights "could be limited if the land were needed
for white settlement."'' On remand, Judge Doyle interpreted this limitation
to mean that the exercise of treaty fishing rights was restricted to ceded lands
not privately owned as of the date of the LCO I decision, March 8, 1983."
The United States Court of Appeals in LCO II" found that Judge Doyle had
supra note 174, at 386 (quoting LCO 1, 700 F.2d at 348).
184. LCO II, 653 F. Supp. at 1426.
185. Id.
186. GETcHES, supra note 75, at 884.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-
Wisconsin, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (W.D. Wis. 1991); see Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Wis.
1992), rev'd, 991 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1993), remanded, 843 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 41
F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. 514 U.S. 1096 (1995).
190. Il
191. LCO 111, 653 F. Supp. at 1431.
192. Id. at 1422-23.
193. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985) (LCO I1).
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been too literal in interpreting the court of appeals decision in LCO I."
LCO H rejected the use of a certain date to determine which lands were
privately owned and thus not available for the exercise of Indian fishing
rights.'95 The court of appeals attempted to clarify what it meant by
"settlement."'. ..'Settlement' by non-Indians [was] synonymous with 'private
ownership.""" Thus, the Chippewa could exercise treaty rights on public
lands regardless of whether the lands were privately owned in the past.'
The task was left to Judge Doyle in LCO III to further define "settlement"
and "private ownership."'" He declared that "privately owned lands" meant
"lands that are privately owned as of the time Chippewa exercise of
usufructuary rights is contemplated or carried on."' Lands are not privately
owned just because at some time in the past they were so owned, but now are
publicly owned. Furthermore, if owners of private lands allow the public
to fish on their land, the owners must also allow Indians to exercise their
usufructuary right to fish on their land.' Also before Judge Doyle in LCO
III were several other issues. The Judge dealt with these issues in two
phases.' Phase I involved looking at ethnographic and ethnohistorical
information to determine what the activities of the Chippewa were at the time
the treaty was signed, what usufructuary rights the tribe has today, and
whether there was any basis for state regulation.' Phase II would consider
the nature and extent of any such regulation'
Factual findings concerning Indian activities were as follows: (1) Chippewa
"harvested virtually everything on the landscape" including fish, wildlife, and
plants, (2) Chippewa harvested for subsistence living and commercial
purposes, (3) Chippewa did not harvest more than needed for a "moderate,
satisfactory living," (4) roving habits of the Chippewa prevented exhaustion
of natural resources, (5) the lands were not conducive to agriculture, and (6)
Chippewa fished inland waters with use of weirs, spears, hoop nets, harpoons,
hook and line, gillnets, seines, and decoys.' After the factual review, Judge
Doyle held that the Chippewa had the same off-reservation rights to harvest
194. LCO II, 653 F. Supp. at 1423.
195. Nelson, supra note 174, at 388.
196. LCO 11I, 653 F. Supp. at 1431.
197. Id.
198. Nelson, supra note 174, at 388-89. If treaty rights were forever extinguished when
public property became publicly owned, "unscrupulous public officials could sell property to
unscrupulous private individuals" to frustrate the exercise of Indian treaty fishing rights. Id.




203. Id at 1423.
204. ld
205. Id




all the natural resources in the ceded territory, as they did at treaty time.an
Chippewa also could harvest commercially.' The manner of harvesting
could be done with techniques and equipment used at treaty time or as
developed since then.' Judge Doyle rejected the notion that the Wisconsin
fish resource needed to be allocated at that time because the resource was not
yet endangered or scarce." ° When allocation is required, the Chippewa will
be entitled to a share of the fish resource which will insure them a modest
living."' But treaty rights to fish could be subject to state regulation if
"restrictions are reasonable and necessary to conserve a particular
resource.'212
The issue left for Phase II, the nature and extent of state regulation, was
decided by Judge Crabb in LCO IV.23 Although the Judge admitted that the
Chippewa could not have understood at the time of the treaty signing that
regulation for survival of the fish resource might be needed, the Chippewa
were capable of understanding that, should such state regulation be needed,
it would be the least restrictive regulation possible."4 Furthermore, if the
conservation goal could be met by regulating non-Indians, then the state could
not regulate Indian fishing.
15
For the first time, however, the court in LCO IV decided that not only
could the state regulate off-reservation Indian fishing when "reasonable" and
"necessary" to the goal of conservation - ensuring the perpetuation of the
species - but it could also regulate for public welfare and safety reasons.2"'
State regulation for public welfare and safety is valid if (1) there is a need to
regulate a particular resource in a particular area for public health or safety
reasons, (2) the regulation is needed to prevent anticipated harm, (3) the
regulation must be applied to the Indians in order to protect the welfare and
safety of the public, (4) the regulation is the least restrictive alternative, and
(5) the regulation does not discriminate against the Indians.27 Absent these
conservation and public welfare and safety needs, the tribe has sole
jurisdiction over treaty off-reservation fishing.' However, tribal
enforcement has to be performed in an effective and competent manner.2 9
207. Id at 1430.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1434.
211. Id. at 1435.
212. Id.
213. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (LCO
IV); see LCO III, 653 F. Supp. at 1435; Nelson, supra note 174, at 390.
214. Nelson, supra note 174, at 391 (discussing LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1236).
215. Id. at 391 (discussing LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1236).
216. Id at 390-91 (discussing LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1235-36, 1242).
217. Id at 391 (citing LCO IV, 688 F. Supp. at 1239).
218. Id. at 392 (citing LCO IV, 688 F. Supp. at 1241).
219. Id. (citing LCO IV, 688 F. Supp. at 1242).
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To ensure effectiveness, the court ordered the parties to exchange scientific
informationm'
The judge also clarified that the moderate living standard established in
LCO III provides for a minimum harvest level but does not limit Indian
harvests when allocation of the fish resource is not needed. Again, as in
LCO IXl, the resource had not become endangered or scarce, so there was no
need to allocate.' In LCO V, the court attempted to determine in monetary
terms what a "moderate living" was.m An expert testified that "even if the
tribes could exploit every harvestable natural resource in the ceded territory,
they would not derive sufficient income from those resources to provide their
membekrs with a moderate standard of living."' The Chippewa then argued
that they were entitled to the entire harvest because the 1837 and 1842 treaties
guaranteed them a moderate living." The State disputed this, claiming
Indians had not been guaranteed exclusive rights to the entire harvest.'
Rather, the Chippewa should have at most a 50% share.'
In LCO V, Judge Crabb refused once more to allocate the resource because
the resource was not yet scarce. Nevertheless, she did hold that if
allocation were needed, the "moderate living" standard did "not provide a
practicEd way to determine the plaintiffs share of the harvest potential.""
LCO VI' again addressed tribal regulation of off-reservation fishing.
Judge Crabb held that the tribal regulation of the two particular species of
sport fish at issue, walleye and muskellunge, was effective, therefore state
regulation was unnecessary." However, the court did require the Indians to
incorporate into their resource management plans exploitation and safety
factors based on the latest biological information which would be used to
determine what the Indians could safely harvest without endangering the
resource.
2n
220. Id. (citing LCO IV, 688 F. Supp. at 1242).
221. Wilkinson, supra note 167, at 400 (discussing LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1240).
222. Nelson, supra note 174, at 391-92 (discussing LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1240).
223. Id. at 392 (citing Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin, 686 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (LCO V0).
224. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 740 F.
Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (LCO VII).
225. Id. at 1414.
226. Id.
227. Id. (relying on Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 707 F.
Supp. 1034 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (LCO VI).
231. Id. at 1055.
232. Id. at 1043-57. See Nelson, supra note 174, at 394-96, for an example applying the




Even though there was no evidence that the Indian harvest of fish, deer, or
timber was endangering the perpetuation of the species or approaching
anywhere near the 50% level, the court in LCO VII was ready to address the
issue of allocation. 3 While the Chippewa understood from the treaties that
they were guaranteed a "modest living," they also must have understood that
there would be competition for the resource.' Therefore, the parties did not
intend that the Chippewa would have exclusive rights to the entiie harvest,
"even if their modest living needs would otherwise require it. The non-Indians
gained harvesting rights under those same treaties that must be
recognized."" s Even though the 1837 and 1842 treaties did not contain the
same "in common with" language as the treaties in the Washington cases did,
Judge Crabb held that the Indians were entitled to a maximum share of 50%
"to prevent the frustration of the non-Indian treaty right."' 6 If their "modest
living" needs could be ever be met with less than 50%, then the lower amount
would reflect the Indian share of the harvest' ' 7 In calculating the Indian's
share, the 50% factor is applied to all harvest from all lands, including private
landsY However, the Indian's share of the harvest could be taken from
public lands but not private lands. 9
In LCO-Immunity,' the Chippewa brought suit seeking restitution and
damages for past deprivation of their treaty fishing rights. The court held that
after more than sixteen years of litigation which resulted in determinations
that their treaty rights had been violated for over 130 years, "plaintiffs are left
with no means of recovering monetary damages from the state [because of the
State's constitutional Eleventh Amendment immunity] except in the unlikely
event that the United States joins this suit on their behalf."'" Judge Crabb
felt that while this result was unfortunate and "wholly at odds with promises
made to [the Chippewa] in the treaties of 1837 and 1842,""m she was "not
free to rule otherwise.''43
Finally, Judge Crabb ordered that the Chippewa's reserved usufructuary
rights to those resources used when they entered the treaties of 1837 and
1842, but did not reserve the right to harvest commercial timber.' She
233. LCO VII, 740 F. Supp. at 1414.
234. Id. at 1416.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1418.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1420. Judge Crabb did suggest that if in the future the Indian's share could not
be satisfied by harvesting on public lands, access to private lands may be necessary. Id.
240. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 749 F.
Supp. 913 (,V.D. Wis. 1990) (LCO-Immunity).
241. IM. at 922.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 923. "The Eleventh Amendment embodies the principle that the states are
immune from being sued in federal court without their consent." Id. at 922.
244. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 775 F.
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reached this result in LCO VIII" by looking at the activities the Indians
engaged in at the time the treaties were signed, and logging was not one of
them." She also ordered, consistent with past decisions, that the state was
enjoined from interfering with tribal regulation of off-reservation fishing rights
on the condition that the tribal management plan contain "biologically sound
principles" necessary for the safe harvest and conservation of the species."4
All reserved rights to harvest resources are to be apportioned equally between
Indians and non-Indians.' The state could enforce certain state hunting
regulations until the Indians adopted identical regulations." Otherwise, the
state can only regulate treaty off-reservation hunting and fishing rights in the
interest of conservation and public health and safety.'
With most of all the major legal issues decided by the district court, the
question remains whether the parties can cooperate in carrying out these
decisions, or whether the district judge will have to continue to be an active
"fish master." In order to enter into such a cooperative management
agreement, the State of Wisconsin must first "squarely recognize the sovereign
authority of the Chippewa bands and the State of Wisconsin. Second, some
form of joint tribal-state natural resource commission should be
established."" The commission should ideally share information, combine
research efforts, and cooperatively set and enforce regulations." However,
this is unlikely as Wisconsin courts have interpreted the state's constitution as
prohibiting the sharing of responsibility for the states resources."
V. Fishing Rights Controversy in Michigan
Michigan, surrounded by the Great Lakes and blessed with an abundance
of inland lakes and streams, has had a similar acrimonious history regarding
Indian fishing rights. The treaties signed with Indians in Michigan contain
different language than the treaties in Washington and Wisconsin, yet case
law interpreting those treaties did have a role in shaping jurisprudence
concerning the Indian treaty fishing rights in Michigan. In People v.
Jondreau, the Supreme Court of Michigan appreciated the instructive quality
of other case law interpreting various treaties with the Indians, but did not
consider these cases binding because they involved interpretation of
I
Supp. 321, 322 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (LCO VIII)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 323.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 324.
250. Id.
251. Wilkinson, supra note 167, at 411.
252. l
253. Nelson, supra note 174, at 415.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss1/4
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language that was not present in the treaties signed by Indians in
Michigan.' Yet, the court in Jondreau rejected Michigan precedent, as
well, and relied instead on the reasoning of Idaho state courtsY5 In United
States v. Michigan,' the leading case establishing Indian fishing rights in
Michigan today, the federal district court Judge Fox conducted an
exhaustive review of case law from other federal and state jurisdictions
before making his decision. Therefore, it is likely that federal and state
decisions from other jurisdictions will be relied upon as Michigan faces
many of the same legal issues faced by other states concerning usufructuary
treaty rights of the Indians.
People v. Jondreau was a decision that surprised many people. Justice
Swainson, writing for the Michigan Supreme Court, commendably "kept his
eye firmly on the judicial history of the matter, on the cases in precedent,
and on the documents that led most directly to his court's decision.
Nevertheless, his opinion handed down, the tribes suddenly had hunting and
fishing prerogatives that were not previously recognized. '11 Yet, this
decision should not have been so surprising when viewed in the context of
decisions made by other courts in the late 1960s through 1980s. The
Michigan Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in People v. Chosa
that state regulation of fishing applied equally to Indians and non-Indians
because all were citizens of the United States.2" Chosa could hardly stand
following the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Puyallup Tribe
v. Department of Game of Washington (Puyallup I) that the Indian right to
fish could not be restricted by the state "even though all Indians born in the
United States are now citizens of the United States."' , However, unlike
Puyallup I, the Court refused to allow the State of Michigan to regulate for
conservation of the species because the Treaty of 1854 with the Chippewa
did not provide for this safeguard as did the Treaty of 1855 with the
Puyallup.'
Testing these newly recognized treaty rights, A.B. LeBlanc, a member
of the Bay Mills Indian Community of Chippewa Indians, fished
commercially without a state issued license and with gill nets in violation
of state fishing regulations." In a format similar to the Wisconsin LCO
254. People v. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Mich. 1971).
255. Id. (rejecting People v. Chosa, 233 N.W. 205 (Mich. 1930) and relying instead on State
v. Arthur, 261 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1953)).
256. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
257. PHILLiP McM. PrrirMAN, DON'T BLAME THE TREATIES 10 (1997).
258. People v. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d at 379 (referring to People v. Chosa, 233 N.W. 205
(Mich. (1930)).
259. Id. at 380 (quoting Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S.
392, 398 (1968)).
260. Id. at 381.
261. People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Mich. 1976); see PrrrMAN, supra note 257,
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cases, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed three issues: (1) did the
Chippewa Indians reserve the right to fish in Lake Superior in the Treaty
of 1836, (2) if the Chippewa reserved these rights, did they abrogate them
by the Treaty of 1855, and (3) if these rights were not abrogated, does State
regulation apply?'
Applying the canons of treaty construction to the language of article 13
of the Treaty of 1836, the court held that the Chippewa reserved fishing
rights in the ceded territory.' The court looked at the activities of the
Chippewa at the time the treaty was signed and nontextual sources and
found that the Indians were devoting "most of their time in quest of food
in the chase or in fishing."2 Evidence that the Indians engaged in
commercial as well as subsistence fishing was found in the treaty language
itself.a Pursuant to the treaty the Chippewa received 100 barrels of salt
and 500 fish barrels annually for twenty years." Thus, the treaty language
providing that lands be ceded by the Indians in exchange "'for the right of
hunting on [those ceded lands] with the other usual privileges of occupancy'
was understood by the Chippewa to include the right to fish." 67
The court also construed the 1836 treaty language, past treaties, and
Chippewa mythical beliefs and determined that the Indians' aboriginal title
to ceded lands extended into the Great Lakes.'n Furthermore, the language
in article 13, reserving the Indians' right to exercise the privileges of
occupancy "until the land is required for settlement" did not terminate the
Chippewas' right to fish on ceded lands because the Great Lakes could not
be "settled."'
After examining the minutes of the treaty negotiations, the court
determined that there was "not the slightest indication ... that the Treaty
of 1855 would affect hunting or fishing rights reserved under the Treaty of
at 10.
262. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d at 202 (referring to Treaty with the Ottawas, etc. Mar. 28, 1836,
7 Stat. 491 [hereinafter Treaty of 1836] and Treaty with Ottowas and Chippewas, July 31, 1855,
11 Stat. 621). It is interesting that the spelling of "Ottowas" in the 1855 treaty changed from the
1836 treaty (Ottawas).
263. Id. at 204.
264. Id (quoting a report prepared in 1836 by the Acting Superintendent of Michigan for
Indian Affairs to the Commission of Indian Affairs).
265. Ik
266. Id (citing article 4 of the Treaty of 1836, supra note 262).
267. Id at 205.
268. Id. at 206-07. The Chippewa legends tell of a pair of
cranes created by the great spirit that chose the Sault Ste. Marie area as their
nesting place because of the plentiful supply of fish to be found there. Upon
coming to rest, the two cranes were transformed into a man and a woman who
were the progenitors of the Chippewa clan in that area.
Id. at 207 (citing ELLEN RusSEL EMERSON, INDIAN MYTHS (1965)).




1836.""27o Given the importance of fishing to the Chippewa way of life, the
Chippewa would not have understood that the language in article 3 of the
Treaty of 1855 would terminate their reserved fishing rights.' Therefore,
reserved rights to fish were not one of the liabilities or claims intended to
be released by the Indians in the Treaty of 1 85 5 fl To read the treaty as
providing such a release would be prejudicial to the Indians.'l
Finally, the court determined the scope of state regulation of off-
reservation treaty rights.27 After reviewing decisions in the Tulee and
Puyallup cases, the court held that the Indians held their off-reservation
fishing rights in common with non-Indians. 5 Even though the "in
common" language of the treaties in the Washington cases was absent from
the Michigan treaties, the court concluded that the proviso 'until the land
was required for settlement' indicates that the interests and rights of the
other citizens of the territory were to be taken into account.""2 6 The United
States would never have agreed to the heavy encumbrance exclusive fishing
rights would have caused on land needed for settlement in Michigan."r
The court continued its reliance on the: Puyallup I to determine that the
state could regulate the manner of off-reservation tribal fishing if (1) the
regulation prohibiting the use of gill nets was necessary for the preservation
of the fish resource, (2) application of the regulation to the Chippewas was
necessary for preservation of the fish resource, and (3) the regulation did
not discriminate against the Chippewas.2 8 However, as decided in Tulee,
the State could not charge the Chippewa a fee for a license issued by the
State in order to exercise their off-reservation fishing rights.'
The decisions in the State courts did not resolve the conflict between the
State, non-Indian fishers, and the Indian fishers.' "[S]carcely a day
[went] by without an article appearing in one or more of the state's major
newspapers concerning the controversy."'" In 1973, the United States
brought a federal action on behalf of the Bay Mills Indian Community to
protect Indian treaty rights to fish in the Great Lakes and enjoin the State
of Michigan from interfering with these rights. Additionally, Bay Mills
270. Id. at 211.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 209.
273. Id. at 212.
274. Id. at 215.
275. ai at 213-14.
276. Id. at 213.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 215 (relying on Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968)
(Puyallup 1)).
279. Id. at 212 (relying on Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942)).
280. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 205 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
281. Id.
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sought to vindicate the Indian right to fish free from state regulation, require
the State to "exercise its police power to regulate any non-Indian fishing
which would be in derogation of these rights," and establish that the right
to fish in the ceded waters of the Great Lakes was exclusive to the
Indians.' The State continued to insist that the Treaty of 1855 was a
removal treaty which extinguished the tribes as well as any treaty fishing
rights reserved in the Treaty of 1836; that Indians had no aboriginal rights
to fish in the Great Lakes; that the "until land is required for settlement"
language in the Treaty of 1836 was a condition subsequent which had been
met by the subsequent settlement of land, thus vitiating any Indian fishing
rights; and that even if there was a treaty right to fish, the State had a right
to regulate fishing for conservation or other reasons under the police powers
of the State.' Judge Fox succinctly summarized the State's argument:
"the State asks the court to abrogate the Indians' aboriginal rights which
have survived for over 12,000 years and are valid to this day. ' u Instead,
"Michigan would take the Indians' subsistence and livelihood, their right to
fish, and divide it by a modem day lottery, the Indians being permitted to




Judge Fox, taking very seriously his responsibility to "ensure guaranteed
constitutional rights against the TYRANNY OF POPULAR
MAJORTIES" and his duty to construe the treaties in accordance with
the canons of treaty construction, issued an extensive eighty-nine-page
opinion popularly called the "Fox decision.""a The decision has been
criticized as being an "imperfect application" of the canons of treaty
construction which require delving into the historical setting of the treaty
signing." The result was the creation of a "most favorite minority
composed of separate but sovereign nationals living within our geographic
and political border - and at our expense." '  Others have commended
the decision as one consistent with the correct application of the canons of
treaty construction.2' The underpinning of the decision was, as required
282. Id. at 203.
283. Id. at 204.
284. Id. at 203.
285. Id. Judge Fox drew an analogy to the plight of the Cherokee in Georgia. Georgia
abolished the tribal government of the Cherokee and distributed Indians lands by a lottery system
to Georgia citizens. Il at 202-03. The State argued that "[t]here is no question but that the State
now and always has stood ready to provide fishing privileges to all our citizens, commercial
fishing privileges to all our citizens on an equal basis, including Indians or others of whatever
race or ethmic background." Id. at 212.
286. Id. at 205. Judge Fox was incensed by sports fishers who attempted to improperly
influence the court's decision by filing petitions with thousands of signatures. See id.
287. Id.
288. PITTMAN, supra note 257, at 11. The author calls this the "historical method." Id.
289. Id.




by the canons, the intent of the Indians, "not that of the white
negotiators."29'
Judge Fox began the process of making his decision with a chronicle of
the treatment of Indians in the United States.2" Next he examined
"documented historic, ethno-historic, anthropologic and archeological
evidence" to determine whether the Chippewa possessed a right of fishing
that could have been reserved or granted by a treaty. 93 The Chippewa
provided evidence that as a community they relied on fishing and used gill
nets to fish productively for centuries.' Thus, applying the principle of
Winans that the Chippewa reserved all rights not specifically conveyed,
Judge Fox was satisfied that the Chippewa implicitly reserved by the Treaty
of 1836 the right to subsistence and commercial fishing by demonstrating
the importance of the fisheries resource to the Chippewa community before
and after entering into the Treaty of 1836.295
Then because the text of the treaties of 1836 and 1855 is "general, vague
and ambiguous"'2 the Judge reviewed nontextual information including
treaty negotiations and the history of the Chippewa to assist in interpreting
the meaning of certain provisions and determine if the Chippewa explicitly
reserved the right to fish or whether they "knowingly signed away their
right to fish."2"
in Michigan, DEr. C.L. REv. 1097, 1118 (1980).
291. Id.
292. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 200-12 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
293. Id. Judge Fox found the tribe's experts, who were ethnohistorians and anthropologists
educated in the history and customs of the Chippewa, to be much more credible witnesses than
the State's experts, an American historian and a fisheries biologist.
294. I. There were two fishing seasons in the spring and fall. In the spring, up to 200
Indians would gather in fishing villages located on the shores of the Great Lakes. Id. at 222.
After the fall season the Indians would break up into small family units and disperse inland to
hunt. Id. Fishing was particularly important as agricultural activities were limited by short
growing season north of Traverse City. Id. at 221. Gill nets were used on the Lower Great Lakes
beginning around 2500 B.C. and eventually spread to the Upper Great Lakes. Id. at 222. Indian
fished for sturgeon, suckers, pike, whitefish, and lake trout. Id. Frenchman Joutel wrote of Indian
gill net fishing in 1687:
They go as far as a league out into the lake to spread their nets, and to enable
them to find them again, they leave marks, namely, certain pieces of cedar wood
which they call "aquantiquants," which serve the same purpose as buoys or
anchors. They have nets as long as 200 fathoms and about 2 feet deep. At the
lower part of those nets they fasten stones to make them go to the bottom, and on
the upper part they put pieces of cedar wood... called floats.
Id. Indians fished commercially and traded with the French as early as the middle 18th century.
Id. at 223. Well before the Treaty of 1836, fishing had become vitally important to the Indians
both as a means of survival and a means of providing a livelihood. Id.
295. Id. at 213, 279.
296. Id. at 213.
297. Id. at 214.
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Article 13 of the Treaty of 1836 provides that the "Indians stipulate for
the right of hunting on the lands ceded, with the other usual privileges of
occupancy, until the land is required for settlement." 9 Judge Fox
examined the circumstances under which the treaty was signed to determine
the meaning of this language.' Henry Schoolcraft, the Indian agent,
arranged for the treaty to be negotiated and signed with the Chippewa in
Washington, D.C." There the Chippewa signed a "treaty written by white
traders, explained to them by white interpreters, and fostered by men who
had supplied them with firewater for years." '' From the payments to be
given to the Chippewa in exchange for their land, Schoolcraft and the
traders were assigned the right to be paid first for debts owed to them for
liquor and other supplies."
Judge Fox also examined the intentions of the parties who signed the
treaties.3" This was a difficult task as intentions and motivations differed
between the Indians and the United States as well as between the members
representing each party."0 While the dominant motivation of the non-
Indians parties to the treaty appeared to be "cheat[ing] the Indians out of
their lands and reduc[ing] their holdings to the reservation, the motives of
the Indians seemed to be mixed. 0 Some wanted the annuities, some
wanted to protect their fishing grounds from non-Indians, and others wanted
to secure blacksmith services to make and repair implements used for
fishing." Some wanted to sell their land, others did not."
Notwithstanding the various motivations and intentions, the United States
extinguished aboriginal title to a large portion of Indian lands and the
Chippewa returned home with assurances that they would be able to
continue to use these lands they had ceded as they had before the treaty was
signed."
The promises in the 1836 treaty were not kept, but land unimpeded by
Indian claims was needed for non-Indian settlement and the exploitation of
298. Id at 213 (citing the Treaty of 1836, supra note 262).
299. Id at 215-16.
300. Id at 215. Lewis Cass, Secretary of War, assisted Henry Schoolcraft in making the
treaty arrangements.
301. Id. "[Tihe final version of the treaty was drafted behind closed doors by Henry
Schoolcraft and the traders." Id.
302. Id. at 215. Schoolcraft successfully negotiated over $50,000 for his family. Id.
Schoolcraft and the traders together received over $250,000. Id. at 216.
303. Id. at 226-30.
304. Id at 226.
305. Id
306. Id
307. Id at 228-29. The Ottawas did not want to sell at all. Some of the Chippewa were
reluctant to sell. Id. at 229.




valuable minerals.3" This led to the Treaty of 1855 which, like the 1836
Treaty, set up reservations near traditional fishing grounds."' It also
extinguished unfulfilled obligations of the Treaty of 1836."'
Following this insightful and exhaustive historical review, Judge Fox
construed the ambiguous language in article 13 as the Indians would have
understood it, that the Indians would have to accommodate their rights to
hunt on ceded lands to the rights of settlers."' However, the limitation
was not understood to affect the Indian right to fish on the Great Lakes,"3
because the Indians understood that as long as Indians lived in Michigan
they had the right to fish on ceded lands. Since it "was not possible to settle
the Great Lakes and their connecting waters."3 4 Judge Fox held that the
Chippewa "reserved an aboriginal right to fish in the waters of the Great
Lakes ceded by the Treaty of 1836."M'5 This right included taking of fish
from the Great Lakes for both subsistence and commercial fishing
purposes."6 It was "inconceivable" that the Chippewa would have given
up their "way of life and signed a treaty which they understood to make that
way of life impossible.
31 7
Moreover, the failure to incorporate the "in common with" language of
the treaties in the Washington cases into the Treaty of 1836, meant that the




Therefore, the Chippewa may exercise their fishing rights without regulation
by the State of Michigan."9 Michigan regulations inconsistent with
recognition of these treaty rights were void.3" Furthermore, any attempt
309. Id. at 216.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 279.
313. Id. "According to the Indian understanding, Michigan Indians could hunt and fish 'as
long as the sun rose and the waters flowed."' Id. at 238.
314. Id. For various meanings that could be attributed to the words "until land is needed for
settlement," see id. at 236-38.
315. Id. at 216. Judge Fox looked to other provisions of the treaty to support his
interpretation of article 13. Id. at 232-34. Two reservations of land in article 2 and article 3
specifically reserved fishing grounds. Id. at 232. These two were specifically and exclusively
reserved to the Indians because they were the subject of dispute at the time the treaty was signed.
These specific reservations did not imply that other fishing grounds were not reserved. Id. at 233.
Instead, consistent with Winans, the failure to mention fishing grounds in relation to any of the
other reserved lands meant that the United States did not desire to acquire those rights. Id. at 234.
Consonant with the Michigan Supreme Court decision in LeBlanc, Judge Fox found that article
4 providing the Indians with hundreds of fish and salt barrels acknowledged that the Indians
engaged in commercial fishing. Id.
316. Id. at 213.
317. Id at 231.
318. Il at 270.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 281.
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of the state to regulate Indian fishing was preempted by both federal
regulation and tribal self-regulation."' Finally, Judge Fox found nothing
in the Treaty of 1855 which abrogated the Chippewa reserved right to fish
under the Treaty of 1836. "
By the time the case was decided in 1979, two other tribes had
intervened, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (GTB). Judge Fox then
enjoined Michigan officials from interfering in any way with the Indians'
rights to fish with gill nets and enjoined certain state court judges from
continuing to decide an action before them concerning the rights of Indians
to engage in gill net fishing in Grand Traverse Bay.3" The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a stay of Judge Fox's order
based on the strong possibility of irreparable damage or destruction of the
fishery in the bay caused by the use of gill nets." The court remanded
the case to district court to determine the preemptive effect of recently
issued federal Indian fishing regulations."z But in remanding the court
instructed the district court to assume that LeBlanc correctly stated that state
regulation is permissible for conservation of the species should the district
court decide that federal regulation did not preempt state regulation."
While deciding the issue, the Secretary of Interior allowed the federal
regulations to lapse. 2 The State of Michigan then issued emergency
regulations that were more restrictive on Indian rights to fish with gill nets
than the federal regulations were.3" Recognizing the Indian's treaty
protected aboriginal right to fish with gill nets, the court, nevertheless,
found that this right was not absolute.3
The rule of reason found in LeBlanc must be applied.3 If Indian
fishing with gill nets is likely to cause irreparable harm to the fish resource,
the state may restrict fishing in that manner. Any such restriction must meet
the requirements of LeBlanc: (1) it must be necessary for the conservation
of the fishery, (2) it must be the least restrictive alternative for
accomplishing the conservation goal, and (3) it must not discriminate
against the Indians.33'
321. Id. at 270.
322. Id. at 280.
323. United States v. Michigan, 623 F.2d 448, 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
324. Id
325. Id. at 450.
326. Id.
327. United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 278 (6th Cir. 1981).
328. Id.






However, the State was unable to show that the fisheries would be
irreparably harmed, and, therefore, State regulations were not proper at that
time?32 Federal regulations were to be considered in effect until modified
by the district court.33 In deciding whether to modify those regulations,
the district court should follow the requirements of LeBlanc.3"
The Secretary of Interior later announced that it would not renew the
federal regulations and stated that LeBlanc should be followed.33 The
Secretary also "invited the parties to meet in an attempt to work out a
'consensus management program' which would recognize the concurrent
responsibilities and duties of the State, the Tribes, and the Department of
Interior."3 The State again tried to impose its "emergency regulations"
on Indian gill net fishing.337 Judge Fox determined that the preemption
issue was now moot, and the State indicated that it had no plan at that time
to meet the requirements in LeBlanc."' But the court retained jurisdiction
to decide the appropriateness of any future attempts by the State to regulate
Indian fishing.33
Thus Judge Fox and his successor, Judge Enslen, assumed the role of
"fish master" as the district court continued to supervise the ongoing
litigation between the Chippewa tribes, the State of Michigan's Department
of Natural Resources (MDNR) and the litigating amici, Michigan United
Conservation Club (MUCC) and other sport fishing organizations.' Most
of this litigation concerned disputes over allocation of the fish resource."4
This litigation led to the entry of a consent order in 1985 (1985 Agreement)
setting out the terms of a fifteen-year agreement facilitated by a special
master. 2  The agreement was reached with the Bay Mills Indian
Community, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians?43 The 1985 Agreement
and the Dispute Resolution Mechanism are "supposed to be the device[s] for
resolving continuing differences between the state and the tribes and which
establishes an executive council as the forum for discussion and




335. United States v. Michigan, 520 F. Supp. 207, 209-10 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
336. Id. at 210.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 210-11.
339. Id. at211.
340. PITTMAN, supra note 257, at 11.
341. Consent Order 1985 Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Michigan, 520 F.
Supp. 207 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (May 31, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 Agreement].
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1.
344. PiTTMAN, supra note 257, at 11. The dispute resolution mechanism applies to all
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preserve, and cooperatively manage the fish resource." Restrictions on
harvesting levels differ in each of the Great Lakes and vary by type of fish:
whitefish, lake trout, walleye, perch, salmon, and bloater chubs.3" The
tribes can fish exclusively in some areas called zones and must refrain from
fishing in others.' 7 Tribal commercial fishing with gill nets is only
allowed in designated zones?" The State is required to remove nontribal
State commercial fishing licenses in some areas and reduce nontribal
commercial harvest levels.'
Active participation of the tribes is required in many aspects." In some
areas the State can not license any new persons without obtaining prior
written consent of the tribe."' Tribal authorization of gill net operations
is required to control and limit this activity."' Rehabilitation zones and
cooperative rearing programs are established.353 Both MDNR and the
tribes must agree as to which zones salmon fingerlings will be planted.3"
Tribes participate in various standing committees on enforcement, education,
and fisheries review?" Both the tribes and MDNR are responsible for
providing catch data to each other. "
Finally, differences regarding the 1985 Agreement are to be resolved by
the Executive Council.3" Where parties do not agree with the Executive
Council's decision, the United States district court retains jurisdiction over
these disputes in accordance with the process described in the Dispute
Resolution Mechanism and may appoint a special master to assist with
dispute resolution.358
disputes arising under the 1985 Agreement. A proposal must be placed on the agenda of an
Executive Council meeting. If the Executive Council votes against the proposal, then the United
States v. Michigan Dispute Resolution Mechanism can be invoked.
345. 1985 Agreement, supra note 341, at 3.
346. Id. at 4-24.




351. Id. at 6.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 7, 9, 11.
354. Id. at 9.
355. Id. at 14-16.
356. Id. at 17-19.
357. United States v. Michigan Dispute Resolution Mechanism (1985) [hereinafter Michigan
Dispute Resolution Mechanism] (on file with the American Indian Law Review).
358. 1985 Agreement, supra note 341, at 25; Michigan Dispute Resolution Mechanism,
supra note 357, at 1-2, 6. If a party is unhappy with an Executive Council decision and wants
to trigger the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,' it must first inform the other parties by telephone
and then file an information filing with the court and send copies to other parties. Id. at 2-3. The
opposing party must inform the court of its position in an information filing within 15 days of




One author summarized the effectiveness of the 1985 Agreement and
Dispute Resolution Mechanism as follows:
It is sad to report that the various parties, the state (Michigan
Department of Natural Resources, representing interests of
citizens of the state), the tribes, and the federal government
(Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs) have been
able to resolve very little of any consequence and the United
States citizens of the northern Great Lakes, whose lives and
livelihoods are daily affected by the ongoing negotiations, have
been excluded from the process." 9
Regardless of the criticism of the 1985 Agreement, from the historical
context of Federal Indian Policy, the fact that such an agreement was made
represents a major change in the way Indians have been treated. In the era
of self-determination cooperative agreements between a state sovereign and
tribal sovereign are now possible. Under the 1985 Agreement the Chippewa
tribes now have a very active role in the management of the fisheries,
responsibilities of both parties are set out, and, for the first time, both sides
of the "fishing rights" issue must meet to accomplish common objectives.
Judge Enslen emphasized this point when a matter involving the agreement
was brought before him.
But through your acceptance of the 1985 Consent Decree,
you committed to working together until the conflict was
resolved, at least until the year 2000. That means I do not view
these proceedings . . . as adversarial proceedings. We have a
common goal, and that goal is the just implementation of the
consent agreement.w
Furthermore, the 1985 Agreement demonstrates the willingness of the
Indians to limit their own judicially recognized treaty fishing rights in order
to rehabilitate the resource. Finally, it is unknown what violence and social
unrest might have taken place without the agreement in place.
3 61
Inevitably, however, the parties would disagree over a number of fishing
issues.
to the court within five days of the opponent's information filing. Id. at 4.
359. PrrrMAN, supra note 257, at 11.
360. Transcript of Opening Remarks and Concluding Findings, Rulings, Statements of the
Court at 7, United States v. Michigan, M26-73 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 1992).
361. Response of Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Inc., Litigating Amicus, in
Opposition to Grand Traverse Band's Motion Requesting Modification of the 1985 Consent Order,
Including Its Information Filing Under the Court's Dispute Resolution Mechanism at 4, United
States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV-26 (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 12, 1997).
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VI. Aftermath of the Fox Decision and Year 2000: Current Controversies
[Ilt is in the State's interests - and by State's interest I mean
the State of Michigan and its constituency of sports fishermen -
to accommodate small boat fishers because a short-term victory
in the next ten years will result in a long-term defeat to the
management of the fisheries after ten years have elapsed. That
is so clear that if anyone misses it I guess they deserve to live
with what happens in the year 2000.362
One provision of the 1985 Agreement has generated considerable
disagreement. The GTB (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians) agreed to refrain from fishing with gill nets in two of Grand
Traverse Bay's most productive grids, provided that impoundment gear (trap
nets) and technical assistance was made available to them." In 1992, the
362. William Rastetter, The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 'Our
Opinion,' TRAVERSE CrrY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Sept. 28, 1997, at Eli
[hereinafter Our Opinion] (quoting the district court judge in Transcript of Ruling at 33, United
States v. Michigan (W.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 1990) (No. 999)). When this statement was made there
were 10 years remaining on the 15-year agreement.
363. 1985 Agreement supra note 341, at 12. Grids are an area of approximately 10 square
miles. Paragraph 24 (d) provides:
In grids 616 and 716, only the Grand Traverse Band may fish commercially
subject to seasonal spawning closures and other agreed conservation measures.
However, the parties further agree that the Grand Traverse Band shall be limited
to commercial fishing with impoundment gear in these grids after January 1, 1988,
provided that impoundment gear and technical assistance is made available to the
Grand Traverse Band.
Id. Another paragraph in the 1985 Agreement provided that one license could be issued for chubs
in other areas with small gill nets and for other species using impoundment gear only. Id. at 12-
13, para. 25.
Sport fishermen dislike gill nets because the nets catch indiscriminately non-targeted as well
as targeted fish. Todd Schauer et al., Risk Assessment of Small Fishing Vessel Trap Net
Operations, 32 MARINE TECH. 231, 231 (1995). For example, when gill netting for whitefish,
lake trout, a prized sport fish, is also caught. See id. The way the nets are designed means that
non-targ.ted fish cannot be released as the fish become entangled and are almost always dead
when extracted from the nets. Id. Impoundment gear, also called "trap nets" is a "more complex
and expensive fishing system .... designed to hold fish alive until returned to the water, thus
potentially preserving sport and commercial fish stocks." Id. Trap net fishing involves net
deployment and lifting over the side of the boat which causes heeling (tipping). Id. This means
there is a capsize risk present with trap net fishing not present with gill net fishing, Id. Most
tribal fishing boats are small trailerable boats, 16 foot to 25 foot in length where trap netting
operations would increased the chance of capsize in rough weather. Id. Trap net fishing is more
conducive to larger boats. Id. But this increases the size and expense of the operation. Id. A
dynamic analysis conducted to analyze the capsize risk of two Indian fishing boats, one 22 foot
long and one 27 foot long suggests that conducting trap net operations in parts of Grand Traverse
Bay in three to four and one-half foot waves may present unacceptable safety risks. Id. at 232,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss1/4
COMMENT
State of Michigan brought a motion to enforce the closures to gill net
fishing mandated in the 1985 Agreement.:" The Chippewa protested that
the State had not lived up to its obligation to develop an alternative to gill
netting and requested that it be able to continue gill netting while the
experiment to develop an alternative continued." Judge Enslen granted
the State's motion to prohibit gill net fishing but, nevertheless, found that
the State had not satisfied its obligation to develop a small boat alternative
method to gill netting." State was ordered to pursue at "full throttle" a
cooperative experimentation program. 67
The experimentation program failed after four years to produce a viable
small boat impoundment fishery."6 In addition, the GTB complained that
the State over a period of ten years failed to issue viable permits for
harvesting chubs as required under another provision of the 1985
Agreement." Impatient with the experimentation program and the lack of
fishing opportunities for its fishers, the GTB is now asking the court to
modify the 1985 Agreement to rescind the restriction limiting fishing in two
grids to impoundment gear and to revoke the 1992 injunction prohibiting
gill net fishing. 7 The GTB argues that its agreement to refrain from gill
netting was contingent upon the "condition precedent" that a viable small
boat impoundment fishery would be developed for its displaced fishers. 7'
241.
364. Order, United States v. Michigan, No. M26-73 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 1992); Our
Opinion, supra note 362, at Eli.
365. Transcript of Opening Remarks & Concluding Findings, Rulings, Statements of the
Court at 27, United States v. Michigan, No. M26-73 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 1992).
366. Id. at 27-29.
367. United States v. Michigan, No. M26-73; Our Opinion, supra note 362, at Eli.
368. Grand Traverse Band's Motion Requesting Modification of the 1985 Consent Judgment
at 2, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-CV-26 (M 26-73) (W.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 1997). Fishing
from small boats using scaled-down trap nets resulted in unacceptable harvest levels. Id. at 4.
The experiment then focused fitting larger, trailerable boats with trap nets. Id. at 5. Larger boats
were a problem because they could not be launched at access sites available to GTB small boat
fishers. Id. at 5 n.5. A study on Indian small boat fishing showed that a three-person crew would
lose $6285 to $25,785 a year if it used trap-net boats. Diane Conners, Tribe: Trap-Net Fishing
Is Not Feasible, TRAvERSE Crrg RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), July 16, 1997, at Al.
Trap netting requires an investment of $200,000 for a boat and equipment. Id. Gill netting only
requires an investment of $2000. Id.
369. Grand Traverse Band's Information Filing Regarding Disputes Arising Under Paragraphs
24(d) and 25 at 3, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-CV (M26-73) (W.D. Mich. Jan. 15 1997)
[hereinafter GTB Information Filing Paragraphs 24(d) and 25]. Paragraph 25 provides that in
1985 one chub permit will be issued jointly by GTB and the State for harvesting of chub.
Consent Order 1985 Settlement Agreement at 12, United States v. Michigan. Then depending on
"availability of stocks and tribal needs in subsequent years, additional opportunities for chubs
and/or other species can be made available to the Grand Traverse Band pursuant to jointly issued
State-Tribal authorization. Id. at 12-13.
370. Id. at 1, 3.
371. Id. at 3.
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The State failed to comply with this condition precedent, therefore, the GTB
no longer has to limit its method of fishing in the Grand Traverse Bay Area
to impoundment gear.3" The GTB merely intends to exercise their
"'aboriginal, superior right to fish in certain waters' of Grand Traverse
Bay.- 3r  The GTB also cited several incidents where the sport fishing
groups, the litigating amici, refused to agree to any accommodation of the
GTB's superior right. 4 If these groups were unwilling to compromise,
then the tribe need not compromise their fishing rights.?S
In addition to the law of contracts "condition precedent" argument, the
GTB also argues that the goals of the 1985 Agreement have not been
achieved; therefore, modification to the agreement is necessary.3 76 The
legal standard for modifying the 1985 Agreement is "the indication of a
defect or a deficiency in the original decree which impedes the decree from
achieving its goal either because experience has proven it less effective,
disadvantageous, or because circumstances and conditions have changed
which warrant fine-tuning the decree."3 The GTB argues that this legal
standard is met .'because experience has proven [the "impoundment gear"
limitation] disadvantageous' to the GTB's small-boat fishers.
''
131
Finally, the GTB threatens that if no modification is forthcoming it is
"entitled to fish everywhere within the Grand Traverse Bay Area.137
Furthermore, "[i]f the State and litigating amici expect the GTB to
372. Id. GTB cited contract law and law of judgments in support of its position. Id. at 10-
11. "In regotiating a contract the parties may impose any condition precedent, the performance
of which is essential before they become bound by the agreement . I..." ld  at 10 (quoting 17
AM. JUR.2D, Contracts § 24, at 360 (1964). "[A] judgment may be set aside or modified if: (2)
There has been such a substantial change in the circumstances that giving continued effect to the
judgment is unjust." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (SECOND) § 73 (1982).
373. Brief in Support of Grand Traverse Band's Motion Requesting Modification of the 1985
Consent Judgment at 7, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-CV-26 (M 26-73) (W.D. Mich. Jan.
15, 1997) (quoting Bigelow v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 727 F. Supp. 346, 352
(W.D. Mich. 1989)).
[A]s distasteful as it may seem to [the litigating amicil, they do not possess an
'equal right' to fish in the waters of the coast of the State of Michigan. Judge Fox
ruled, and the Sixth Circuit upheld, that the tribal fishers have an aboriginal,
superior right to fish in certain waters. Bigelow, 727 F. Supp. at 346.
Id.
374. Id. at 8.
375. Id.
376. GTB Information Filing Paragraphs 24(d) and 25 at 4-8. The GTB claimed in 1994 that
the lack of alternative methods of fishing meant that there were "no fishing opportunities in 90%
of the Lke Michigan waters adjacent to GTB's six-county service area." Id. at 7. The 1994 catch
statistics showed that state licensed non-Indians were harvesting substantially more fish than the
GTB was within the GTB's own tribal zone. Id.
377. GTB Information Filing Paragraphs 24(d) and 25 at 4 (citing Heath v. DeCourcy, 888






participate in negotiations for the period subsequent to March 28, 2000, the
first step is an agreement to provide limited small boat fishing opportunities
as had been assured by . the 1985 agreement/order."'3" The State and
litigating amici must realize that they, not the GTB need the 1985
Agreement to continue after the year 2000.2'
Both the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Inc. (MUCC), litigating
amicus, and the State disagree that the restriction placed on the GTB's use
of gill nets is conditioned on the success of the small boat impoundment
gear experiment."r MUCC argues that there is no language in the 1985
Agreement that can be interpreted as a condition precedent.3" The only
promise made was that impoundment gear and technical assistance would
be available from the State.'u There was no specific language in the
agreement mentioning a small boat impoundment gear experiment or the
need for such an experiment to be "successful."3 This experiment was
not conceived by the court until 1990, five years after the 1985 Agreement
was signed.3" The 1985 Agreement could only have contemplated large
scale impoundment gear because that was the only kind of impoundment
gear used on the Great Lakes at that time.3" Judge Enslen made it clear
in 1992 that gill netting was not conditional when he stated "despite my
sympathies ... it is time for all of the tribal communities to let go of the
hope that there will be continued gill netting in areas where the agreement
prohibits it."38
The State argues that if the small boat trap net fishing has failed, the
1985 Agreement does not provide that gill netting will be reinstated. 8 9
Rather, any such failure requires that other alternatives to gill netting be
investigated."9 The State also argues that contract analysis is inappropriate
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Brief in Support of State of Michigan's Response to Grand Traverse Band's Motion
Requesting Modification of the 1985 Consent Judgment at 1-2, United States v. Michigan, No.
2:73 CV 26 (M 26-73) (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 12, 1997) [hereinafter State of Michigan's
Response to GTB's Motion for Modification]; Response of Michigan United Conservation Clubs,
Inc., Litigating Amicus, in Opposition to Grand Traverse Band's Motion Requesting Modification
of the 1985 Consent Order, Including Its Information Filing Under the Court's Dispute Resolution
Mechanism at 8, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV 26 (M26-73) (,V.D. Mich. filed Mar.
12 1997) [hereinafter MUCC in Opposition to GTB's Motion For Modification].
383. MUCC in Opposition to GTB's Motion For Modification, supra note 382, at 10-11.
384. Id. at 8.
385. Id. at 10.
386. Id. at 9-10.
387. Id, at 10.
388. State of Michigan's Response to GTB's Motion for Modification, supra note 382, at 2
(quoting from Opening Remarks and Concluding Findings, Rulings, Statements of the Court at
32-33, United States v. Michigan, No. M26-73 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 1992)); MUCC in Opposition
to GTB's Motion For Modification, supra note 382, at 10.
389. State of Michigan's Response to GTB's Motion for Modification, supra note 382, at 4.
390. Id. The State suggested that drop net or pound net fishing alternatives should be
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because the 1992 Court Order prohibiting fishing with gill nets is not the
result of agreement between the parties, as a consent order or consent
decree would be.39" ' However, it could be argued that the 1992 Court
Order was interpreting the 1985 Agreement which was entered as a consent
order, and, therefore, contract analysis would be appropriate to determine
the intent of the parties when they made the agreement. The State did not
address the GTB's alternative basis in support for modification: that the
legal standard for modification is the presence of a defect or disadvantage
in the original agreement which prevents the goal of the agreement from
being achieved.3"
Finally, the State balked at having to enter into a complex discovery
phase to determine whether the parties have made a good faith effort to
develop the small-boat impoundment fishing."' The State filed an affidavit
which documented the good faith efforts and money spent to develop this
fishery. 9 The State spent over $600,000 to provide trap nets, and other
equipment, vessels, stipends to the GTB fishers, and operating and
maintenance costs 95 In fact, the State contends that small boat fishing
with impoundment gear has not been shown to be infeasible."
It also documented the efforts to issue a permit to fish chubs.3" The
State issued permits requested by the GTB to fish chub every year since
1992."' But GTB refused to accept them because they allowed for joint
enforcement, because the band wanted 50% of the available harvest, and
because the permit only allowed for one agent fisher rather than several."'
Finally, the MDNR asked GTB to provide them with criteria in order that
acceptable permits could be issued to them.4" MDNR then issued the
permits meeting the GTB's requirements including tribal self-regulation
except that MDNR refused to waive the right to pursue the violation in state
courts: The GTB still refused the permits because "it was not
investigated. Id. at 6.
391. IL at 4.
392. See iL at 1-6.
393. Id. at 6.
394. Response to Informational Filing by the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa
Indians at 4-5, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26 (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 12, 1997)
[hereinafter State's Response to GTB's Informational Filing]; Affidavit of Don Nelson, United
States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26 (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Affidavit of
Don Nelson].
395. Affidavit of Don Nelson, supra note 394, at 1-6.
396. State's Response to GTB's Informational Filing, supra note 394, at 4.
397. State's Response to GTB's Informational Filing, supra note 394, at 6-8; Affidavit of
Don Nelson, supra note 394, at 6-9.
398. State's Response to GTB's Informational Filing, supra note 394, at 6.
399. Id. at 7.
400. Id.




appropriate for the MDNR to expect the GTB fishers to operate pursuant to
state law and regulations, when the federal courts have upheld the Indian
Tribes' sovereign right of self-regulation."
Another provision of the 1985 Agreement causing dissension among the
parties concerns the salmon fishery. The 1985 Agreement provides that
salmon fingerlings will be planted by the MDNR at locations agreed upon
by the Tribes and the MDNR °3 Suspended gill nets can only be used
between August 16 and October 30 of each year and use is prohibited
"outside a two mile radius from the stream mouths where such plantings
occur."4 Plantings have occurred in Nunn's Creek in northern Lake
Huron.4 5 The GTB tribal fishers began to fish for salmon outside the two-
mile area around Nunn's Creek." When Skip Duhamel was cited for
illegal fishing, the GTB tribal judge took the opportunity to elaborate on his
interpretation of the 1985 Agreement."° The tribal judge indicated that
fishing with a new kind of salmon net, a net that anchors at the bottom of
the lake bed rather than a gill net that is "suspended," does not violate the
1985 Agreement." Furthermore, Coho salmon and Chinook salmon are
not listed in the agreement, and, therefore, fishing for them is not prohibited
outside the two-mile radius of Nunn's Creek."
Concerned about these tribal court decisions, the state sought a ruling
from Judge Enslen on whether tribal fishers can fish for salmon outside the
Nunn's Creek area."" The tribes response to the State's move was that "the
tribes never would have negotiated away the right to control Salmon by
fishing them" because salmon is a major predator of other fish caught by
the tribe." ' The Nunn's Creek area was just a special fishing grounds
stocked by the State; it was not intended to be the only salmon fishing
grounds." 2 Sport fishermen were upset over the tribes expansion into
Grand Traverse Bay as their license fees were used to stock the salmon in
Grand Traverse Bay." 3 Judge Enslen delivered what the sport fishermen
402. Affidavit of Don Nelson, supra note 394, at 9.
403. 1985 Agreement, supra note 341, at 9-10.
404. Id. at 10.
405. State of Michigan's Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion For a Preliminary Injunction
at 6, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26 (W.D. Mich. filed Aug. 29, 1997) [hereinafter
State's Brief For a Preliminary Injunction].
406. Diane Conners, New Net Catches State's Interest, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE




410. Diane Conners, Fishing Case Goes to Federal Court, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE
(Traverse City, Mich.), Jan. 19, 1996, at BI.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Diane Conners, Court Expands Tribal Fishing Rights in GT Bay, TRAVERSE CITY
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called a "severe blow to the Traverse Bay area fishery" when he issued a
ruling that the GTB may license for the 1996 fishing season one fisherman
to fish for salmon in one area of the Bay, but no fishing was allowed within
one-half mile of a creek or river mouth.414 While pleased with the
decision, the GTB indicated that it would not be satisfied in the future to
license just one salmon fisherman in just one area of Lake Michigan."5
One year later, the GTB pushed for half of the salmon harvest taken out
of Grand Traverse Bay, approximately 125,000 pounds.416 The GTB
refused to compromise and accept any of the State's proposals.4"7 The
GTB claimed that under the Treaty of 1836 it was entitled to fish anywhere
in Grand Traverse Bay and that the tribe "voluntarily suspended much of
those fishing rights" in the 1985 Agreement but was now reasserting
them.418 The GTB then proceeded to issue its own commercial salmon
fishing permits for the 1997 season for 90,000 pounds, more than two times
the tribal salmon harvest in 1996.""9 Angered by the GTB's actions, area
sport fishermen vowed to press the State to pursue an injunction forcing the
tribes to stop salmon fishing and to pursue the arrest of tribal fishers. 4
The MDNR, concerned about two reported incidents of boats becoming
entangled in tribal fishers' gill nets and fearful of similar incidents over the
Labor J)ay weekend, asked Judge Enslen to order an immediate halt to
RECORD 1_AGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Aug. 20, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Court Expands Tribal
Fishing Rights].
414. Id. (referring to United States v. Michigan, No. 23:73 CV26 (W.D. Mich,) order
establishing the terms for the 1996 salmon fishery) (Aug. 15, 1996). Skip Duhamel then tested
the one-half-mile rule by placing his nets within one-half mile of a creek mouth. Dianne
Conners, New Dispute Flares Over Fishing Rights, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse
City, Mich.), Aug. 23, 1996, at Al. When asked by the court to pull his nets, he complained
that "[i]t's nice to say you can have a salmon fishery, but if you can't fish where the salmon
live, it's worthless .... We really feel betrayed." Bill Hicks with the Grand Traverse Area
Sport Fishermen's Association responded, "Well isn't that too bad." "We are fed up with what
is happening." Id. The parties later agreed that Skip Duhamel could fish slightly within the one-
half-mile radius of Belanger Creek. Will Scott, New Guidelines Allow Net Near Belanger Creek,
TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Aug. 31, 1996.
415. Court Expands Tribal Fishing Rights, supra note 413, at Al.
416. Steve Kellman, Tribe Wants to Net More Salmon, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE
(Traverse City, Mich.), July 26, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Tribe Wants to Net More Salmon]. GTB
harvested 38,000 pounds of salmon in 1996, which was 14% of the total salmon harvest. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Diane Conners, Court Won't Hear Gill-Net Dispute Until December, TRAVERSE CITY





salmon fishing on Grand Traverse Bay.4"' The GTB agreed to pull its gill
nets over the busy holiday weekend.4"
Judge Enslen denied the State's motion for an injunction because the
GTB had already taken action to protect public safety.4 Judge Enslen
also refused to grant the State's motion for an expedited hearing to enforce
the provisions of the 1985 Agreement concerning the salmon tribal
fishery." This matter is set to be heard in December 1997." However,
because the parties could not agree to the terms of the interim 1997 salmon
fishery for Grand Traverse Bay, Judge Enslen imposed the 1996 terms with
safety modifications!' Two fishers could be licensed, but the total linear
footage of the nets fished could not exceed 3600 feet, and nets had to be
submerged at least eight feet below the surface.4" The GTB protested that
the tribal fishers could not economically harvest salmon by submerging their
nets eight feet below the surface of the water because the fish were in
shallower waters where the nets could not be dropped that deep.4 Judge
Enslen denied the GTB's motion for reconsideration of the court's eight foot
requirement.429
The State, anxious to focus on negotiating a new agreement for the year
2000, has been frustrated by the GTB's continual testing of the limits of its
treaty fishing rights.4 The GTB, with its own agenda of preserving its
421. Steve Kellman, Tribe Will Pull Nets For Holiday Weekend, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD
EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Aug. 30, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Tribe Will Pull Nets].
Apparently GTB was not marking its nets in accordance with its own regulations. Instead it was
using black and white floats that are difficult to see in rough waters. State's Brief for a
Preliminary Injunction supra note 405, at 6. GTB also failed to give adequate notice to other
users of Grand Traverse Bay that it would be placing it gill nets. Id. at 8.
422. Tribe Will Pull Nets, supra note 421, at Al.
423. Diane Conners, Judge Won't Order Nets Out of Bay, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE
(Traverse City, Mich.), Sept. 5, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Judge Won't Order Nets Out of Bay].
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26, at 1-2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 1997) (order
denying motion for reconsideration and setting the terms of the 1997 target salmon fishery).
427. Id. at 1-3
428. Id. at 1; Judge Won't Order Nets Out of Bay, supra note 422. Skip Duhamel, tribal
fisher, commented on Judge Enslen's order, "I can't submerge nets eight feet under in nine feet
of water [where the fish are] and catch fish." Id. "We won't catch fish, which is exactly what
they want." Id.
429. United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26, at 2.
430. Brief in Support of the State of Michigan's Motion to Enforce Paragraph 22 of the 1985
Consent Order and For an Expedited Hearing and For an Expedited Hearing on the Motion to
Enforce the State's Previous Informational Filing Regarding Paragraph 22 of the 1985 Consent
Order at 8, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV26 (W.D. Mich. filed Aug. 29, 1997)
[hereinafter Brief in Support of State's Motion For Expedited Hearing]. "Worse, unlike what the
Court and Defendant Michigan had hoped, the continued controversy concerning the targeting of
salmon by commercial treaty fishers... has exacerbated the differences between the parties."
Id. The Court and the Special Master must spent time "resolving this issue every year instead of
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treaty fishing rights; seeking proper allocation of the resource; and ensuring
self-determination in the administration and enforcement of those rights,
finally decided it was in the tribe's best interest to end the talks for a new
year 2000 fishing agreement.431 "Thus, from the perspective of the Tribe,
it would be much more productive for time and resources to be spent
internally in developing the management policies and regulations required
to protect the resources once the 15-year consent decree expires than to
participate in negotiations with persons who have unreasonable
expectallons. 432 The expectations of sport fishermen that the GTB should
cut back on taking its share of the salmon harvest by gill netting because
it will "destroy" the fishery when it now only takes 5% and proposes to take
less than one-third of the total salmon harvested, is unreasonable.433
VII. Role of Treaty Interpretation: Vision for Year 2000 Litigation or
Negotiated Agreement
Today, the courts' resort to the application of the canons of treaty
construction to every fishing rights case in order to determine the existence
and scope of treaty fishing rights has become so mechanical that every
result is nondistinct and inevitable. It is as though adherence to the process
of applying such worthy canons must ultimately lead to worthy results. The
courts used these principles to render a long line of decisions in each of
three states, Washington, Wisconsin, and Michigan. The treaties involved
different language, and, yet, the results have been so surprisingly similar
that the treaties construed may as well have been identical.
The first generation of fishing rights cases applicable to these three states
recognized the existence of Indian treaty fishing rights contrary to
precedent.4M In order to reach this result courts in Winans, LCO I, and
Jondreau the courts interpreted various treaty language: (1) in Winans, the
"right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with
citizens of the territory," (2) in LCO I the "privileges of hunting and
fishing. . . are guaranteed to the Indians during the pleasure of the
President" and "right of hunting on ceded territory, with the other usual
privileges of occupancy until required to be removed by the president," and
helping the parties focus on the year 2000." Id.
431. Steve Kellman, Tribe Ends Talks ForNew FishingAgreement, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD
EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Sept. 12, 1997, at Al; Grand Traverse Band's Initial 1997
Memorandum Regarding 22 Dispute in Grand Traverse Bay Area of Lake Michigan at 2-4, No.
2:73 CV26 (M26-73) (W.D. Mich. filed Aug. 8, 1997) [hereinafter GTB's Initial Memorandum
Regarding Paragraph 22] (explaining that the controversy is really just an issue of allocation).
432. Our Opinion, supra note 362, at E1i.
433. GTB's Initial Memorandum Regarding Paragraph 22, supra note 431, at 7.
434. COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ED., supra note 58, at 469 & nn. 16-19. In Michigan, People




(3) in Jondreau, the "right of hunting on the lands ceded, with the usual
privileges of occupancy until the land is required for settlement."
The second generation of cases involved state regulation of off-
reservation treaty fishing rights. In Puyallup I, the court found that the
manner of fishing could be regulated by the State of Washington because
"manner" had not been reserved by the treaty and the "in common with"
language meant Indians could be regulated as well as non-Indians.43
However, the State could only regulate the manner and commercial aspects
of Indian fishing if the regulation was a necessary conservation measure and
did not discriminate against the Indians.436
Judge Doyle in LCO III acknowledged the State of Wisconsin's right to
regulate fishing based on Puyallup I even though the language of the
treaties was different.43 Although conceding that Puyallup I and Puyallup
II decisions were unclear as to the reasons why the State of Washington
could regulate fishing, Judge Doyle felt bound by them and rejected any
efforts to distinguish the Washington cases from the Wisconsin case.43
Again, as in Puyallup I, permissible regulation was limited to that necessary
for conservation and public safety.439
Likewise, the Michigan Supreme Court in LeBlanc adopted the holding
in Puyallup I even though the "in common with" language was not in the
applicable treaty.' This was a complete turnaround from Jondreau where
the court distinguished Puyallup I by holding that the Treaty of 1836 with
the Chippewas did not provide the same protections to the State of
Michigan as the Treaty of 1855 with the Puyallup did." Consequently,
the Michigan Supreme Court relied on precedent that interpreted different
treaty language and the intent of the United States government, rather than
how the Chippewa would have understood the Treaty of 1836 to arrive at
the result in LeBlanc."2 The decision was contrary to a correct application
of the canons of treaty construction in that the court looked at the intent of
the United States government to determine that it would not have
contemplated such an encumbrance on land needed for settlement."3
Later when Judge Fox in United States v. Michigan exhaustively applied
the canons of treaty interpretation to the Treaty of 1836, he held that the
failure to incorporate the "in common with" language meant that the state
435. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
437. LCO 111, 653 F. Supp, at 1435; LCO IV, 668 F. Supp, at 1235.
438. LCO II1, 653 F. Supp, at 1434-35.
439. LCO IV, 668 F. Supp, at 1235.
440. See supra notes 275-77 and accompany text.
441. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
442. See Delekta, supra note 290, at 1117-19, for a critical review of the inconsistencies in
the Jondreau and LeBlanc decisions.
443. See text accompanying note 277.
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could not regulate Indian treaty fishing." However, the United States
Court of Appeals guided future decisions by Judge Fox, indicating that
LeBlanc correctly stated the law regarding state regulation of Indian
fishing."5 The United States Court of Appeals decision did not discuss
Puyallup I or offer any explanation for this decision, but in summarily
adopting LeBlanc it, in a circuitous way, adopted Puyallup L
Professor Ralph W. Johnson criticized the Puyallup I decision:
No valid basis for the existence of such state power [to
regulate fishing] can be found. The Constitution of the United
States provides that treaties are the "supreme law of the land."
Because agreements with the Indians are treaties, the Indians are
not subject to state regulation unless the treaty so provides or
unless Congress so legislates. The treaties with the Indians do
not provide for state regulation and Congress has never
authorized such regulation. Therefore, the Supreme Court
-should clearly hold that the states have no power to regulate
Indian off-reservation fishing ..... "
Assuming Professor Johnson is correct in that Puyallup I is bad law, then
fishing rights jurisprudence in both Washington and Michigan has been built
on a false basis.
The third generation cases dealing with allocation of the fish resource
seem to fit a Washington v. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel
Association mold."7 In the Washington cases the treaty language "in
common with" was interpreted to mean that 50% of the fish would be
allocated to the Indians and 50% to the non-Indians, unless the Indians
could achieve a "moderate living" with a reduced percentage.4" In
Wisconsin, a similar result was achieved even though the "in common with"
language was missing from the applicable treaty."9 In Michigan the 1985
Agreement sets out fishing grounds, manner of fishing and seasonal harvest
levels.450 However, the GTB are pressuring the State and the amici for
50% of the harvest, including the salmon harvest.5
444. See text accompanying notes 317-20.
445. United States v. Michigan, 623 F.2d 448, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1980).
446. Johnson, supra note 58, at 208.
447. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
448. Id. at 686-87.
449. LCO VII, 740 F. Supp. at 1418.
450. 1985 Agreement supra note 341, at 1.
451. Tribe Wants to Net More Salmon, supra note 416, at Al; William Rastetter, There's No
Basis for the Claim of Salmon Depletion in GTBay, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse
City, Mich.), Sept. 28, 1997, at E13 (arguing that "the current salmon fishing "controversy" in




Where court decisions regarding Indian fishing rights are so strikingly
similar, it seems disingenuous for the courts to claim that they are applying
canons of treaty construction to varying language in treaties to reach these
results. It may be more prudent for both sides to recognize that the
likelihood of a decision against the grain is small. Rather than investing
large sums of money to hire anthropologists and ethnohistorians to attempt
to find some slight historic fact that might persuade the court that the
Indians don't have fishing rights, states and sport fishing groups may have
more success if they recognize treaty fishing rights. Having engaged in the
fishing rights litigation for years, both the states and the sport fishermen
could hardly escape gaining some understanding or "literacy" of the Indians
right to fish.
As Professor Pommersheim recently suggested, "literacy" and "cultural
empathy" will open the way toward solving the problem.45 Those who
continue to argue that Indians should only be allowed to fish for subsistence
and with equipment traditionally used, don't know the history or culture of
Indians.453 By exchanging lands with the Chippewas for reserved lands
near their traditional fishing grounds, for the right to hunt on ceded lands
with the "other usual privileges of occupancy," and for one hundred barrels
of salt and 500 fish barrels annually it is clear that the United States
government recognized that the Indians were fishing for more than
subsistence living." "Indian people have fished on a commercial scale for
trade with other tribes since time immemorial, and we know from many
written records that they engaged in trading fish on a commercial scale for
both barter and cash in Michigan 300 years ago." '455 Bruce Catton, a
Michigan historian, described the Indian way of life for the Chippewa, the
most northerly of Michigan Indians, as "hunters and fishers, and inevitably
wanderers who could not live in fixed villages."456 They traded with the
Ottawas who lived south of the them for corn and beans." But even the
Ottawas who grew crops "went en masse to fishing camps in the summer"
and into the woods in the winter to hunt.458 Both tribes also exchanged
goods with traders from Canada.459
"Arguments that Indians should use vine nets and unpowered canoes as
they did when the treaty was signed are silly. Courts have ruled that Indian
fishermen always used the best available technology and have a right to do
452. Pommersheim, Remarks, supra note 15.
453. Eric Sharp, DNR, Indians Should Compromise to Avoid Fishing Battle, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Sept. 4, 1997.
454. Treaty of 1836, supra note 262, at 492.
455. Sharp, supra note 453.
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so today."' Thus, Indians are not limited to using the equipment
available to fish with at the time the treaty was signed, "just as non-Indians
are not so limited. Indians may employ modem boats, nets and other
techniques in the exercise of treaty-reserved rights.""'
Other complaints frequently advanced by sport fishermen focus on
Indians taking of fish species introduced by the state after the treaties were
signed."' The GTB are taking salmon planted with money from fishing
licenses purchased by sport fishermen.4' However, drawing a distinction
between an Indian right to fish native as oppose to non-native planted fish
has been rejected by the court in United States v. Washington.4" The 1985
Agreement with Chippewa tribes in Michigan provides for the stocking of
perch, lake trout, and salmon in certain areas of the Great Lakes."
Obviously the 1985 Agreement contemplated Indian fishing of planted
species. In addition, the MDNR injected a coded wire tag (CWTs) to trace
harvested fish. A "[p]reliminary analysis of CWTs suggests that only about
of the salmon caught in the GTB fishery were from a known stocking
location."" The remainder were probably from naturally reproduced or
salmon immigrating from other Great Lakes.
Additionally, sport fishermen accuse the Chippewa of the "destruction"
or "decimation" of fish stocks.4' However, statistical information collected
by the state and reviewed by the Technical Fisheries Review Committee on
1996 harvest levels indicates that Indian fishermen took as little as 11% of
the harvest, or 2401 salmon of the 21,795 harvest." Sport fishermen, on
460. Sharp, supra note 453; see LCO I1, at 1435 (holding that the right to fish includes "use
of all the methods of harvesting employed in treaty times and those developed since"and use of
"modem methods of distribution and sale"); COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ED., supra note 58, at 447
(explaining that the historical review of places and methods of fishing required by a correct
application of canons of treaty interpretation is done for the purpose of determining the intent of
the parties, not for the purpose of limiting the right to fish).
461. COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ED., supra note 58, at 447 (citing United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aftd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) and
Washington v. Washington Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
462. Zehner, supra note 18, at E12.
463. lId
464. COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ED., supra note 58, at 448 (citing United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974)) (explaining that "[tihe right secured by the
treaties to the Plaintiff tribes is not limited as to species of fish [or] the origin of fish").
465. 1985 Agreement, supra note 341, at 9, 10, 22.
466. TECHNICAL FISHERIES REviEw COMM., 1996 REPORT TO THE ExEcUTIVE COUNCIL 4-5
(1996).
467. Zehner, supra note 18, at E12 (claiming "over-exploitation" and "decimation" of fish
stocks by Indians); The Battle over Indian Fishing Rights on the Grand Traverse Bay Stirs Up
Turbulent Waters (Heritage Broadcasting Co. of Michigan, WWTV and WWUP-TV News
broadcast, Sept. 10, 1997). Jack Nowland, of Grand Traverse Area Sports Fishing Association,
expressed concern over more nets in Grand Traverse Bay and the depletion of the fishery. Id.




the other hand took 32%, or 6934 salmon, with fish weirs taking 57%, or
12,460 salmon. 9
Finally, the sportfishermen make an equal protection claim.
[They] ask that all Indians be treated and recognized as citizens,
and we ask that all laws be equally administered to all citizens.
Discrimination against is own citizens is being practiced by
our federal government. Indians who don't recognize themselves
as citizens of the United States are being given preferential
treatment.470
This equal protection argument has been rejected by courts.47' Indians
derive their rights from aboriginal title, treaties, and federal law, not as
sport fishermen do from the state as a privilege.4' The sport fishermen
claim equal rights to fish based on payment of a nominal sum for a license
whereas the Indians right to fish has been acquired over 12,000 years. 4"
"Clearly then there are no constitutional impediments to treating Indian
fishermen differently than other state citizens. 474
The least coherent argument advanced by those who are opposed to
recognizing Indian fishing rights is "aren't these the same Indians who used
to war with other tribes and the government and kill white settlers?" It is
not clear if this argument is advanced because they think the Indians don't
deserve "superior rights" to fish or because they think the United States won
various wars against the Indians and, therefore, is in the superior position
of dictating what the Indians' rights are, and these rights shouldn't include
fishing non-native species with gill nets. However, if the savagery of one's
ancestors is a reason for denying rights, there is no group of people
including white settlers, whose rights could not be restricted.47
469. Id.
470. Zehner, supra note 18, at E12.
471. See United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 270-71 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (relying
on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)). "If the State were correct, however, Indian
fishermen would derive nothing from their treaty. Indeed, it would be as if there were no treaty
at all." li at 271; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ED., supra note 58, at 469 (citing
Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977),
vacated and remanded sub noa. Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
472. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 270-71 (explaining that the "Supremacy
Clause mandates different treatment because Indian fishermen derive their rights, not privileges,
under federal law").
473. Id. at 271.
474. Id
475. There is some indication that white settlers may have provoked the Indians to commit
violent acts of savagery:
[M]any murders of priests and converts took place, sometimes by hostile Indians,
who seem to have been instigated to commit the crimes by whites, and sometime
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These arguments are advanced by those who are directly opposed to a
long line of court decisions recognizing tribal fishing rights, or by those
who are either unintentionally or deliberately "illiterate" regarding these
rights. A recent example of such illiteracy was displayed in hearings held
by a republican task force on hunting and fishing held in Traverse City,
Michigan. Sport fishermen found legislators to be a receptive audience to
their arguments for banning of gill netting."6 The same time-worn
arguments of only allowing subsistence fishing and limiting Indian
harvesting of fish to those species taken at the time the treaty was signed
were advanced by an angry audience of sport fishermen.4 Instead of
promoting some kind of compromise position, these legislators "sympathized
with their plight" and vowed to act on their behalf."' Representative
DeVuyst stated, "Any place we've been successful in creating a fishing
hatchery, they [Chippewas] want to go in .... They probably won't be
satisfied until they've fished it out."'"" Representative McManus reported
that she had introduced resolutions recognizing the "rights of state and U.S.
residents to hunt and fish."4 Both Devuyst and McManus promised to co-
sign legislation tying approval of tribal gambling casinos to fishing
rights'
This hearing was disturbing for a couple of reasons. First, sports fishing
groups have been involved in litigation in Michigan concerning Indian
fishing for years. They have heard testimony describing the historical,
cultural and religious significance of fishing to the Indians, yet they
steadfastly refuse to acknowledge it. They want only the present to
determine the rights, equal rights between Indians and sport fishermen, all
as United States citizens. By refusing to acknowledge this history, culture,
and the different origins of Indian fishing rights from their owh, sport
by the Europeans themselves.... That the Red Man when on the war-path is a
brutal savage is a fact that cannot be gainsaid, but I have my own opinion about
the amount of provocation he received. I have not been able to discover that he
ever commenced hostilities without provocation, though there is no doubt that his
reprisals were often visited on innocent victims. I am sorry to add that there is
also no doubt his attacks were often instigated by both French and English, one
against the other.
PAUL FOtUNTAIN, THE GREAT NORTH-WEST AND THE GREAT LAKE REGION OF NORTH AMERICA
316 (1904). The author wrote of his travels and observations in Michigan and other areas of the
Great Lakes region.
476. Steve Keilman, Panel Hears Protests Over Gill Netting, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD
EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Nov. 8, 1997, at Al. Approximately 60 angry sport fishermen









fishermen and their legislators, who blindly give life and legitimacy to the
sport fishermen's cause, perpetuate the controversy.
Secondly, by holding fishing rights hostage to gambling casinos, these
legislators again fail to show any understanding of where fishing rights
originate. These rights were reserved and lands were ceded in exchange for
them. Taking the sport fishermen's argument one step further, the Indians
are making too much money from gambling and, therefore, no longer need
fishing rights. Exercising these rights means culture, religion, and
sovereignty to the Indians. Because a tribe chooses to pursue economic
development doesn't mean it must give up its beliefs, traditions, or culture.
This trade off has never been imposed on any ethnic group of people in the
United States.
It is not surprising, given the prevailing attitude concerning treaty fishing
rights, that the GTB has called off negotiations.4 Negotiation means
compromise. If the sport fishermen are willing to compromise nothing,
there is no reason to come together to negotiate and every reason for the
sport fishermen to fear the GTB's every step toward further defining their
sovereignty.4 The GTB, like other tribes, is a sovereign that wants to
"exercise its power to allow its culture to flourish."4 Sport fishermen are
fearful of what this means. If sport fishermen were 'literate" there would
be no basis for fear.4" Instead, there would be a "basis for mutual
collaboration."4"
If sport fishermen and the State of Michigan could accept that judicial
precedent has established the existence and scope of Indian rights to fish,
the Indian fishing disputes could reach a new plateau beyond resorting to
the rigorous process of treaty interpretation.4 "[I]t is in everyone's
interest to search for ways to de-emphasize litigation, and to direct time and
money elsewhere in searching for durable solutions to the many, varied and
complex ongoing problems."4" It is time to turn from the courts "to the
negotiating tables. '
While Michigan does have an agreement in place and a dispute resolution
mechanism, these are court ordered, and the court has considerable ongoing
482. See Our Opinion, supra note 362, at Eli.
483. Zehner, supra note 18, at E12 (stating adamantly that "[s]port fishermen believe there
should be no negotiations in this matter").
484. Pommersheim, Remarks, supra note 15. Professor Pommersheim's remarks applied to
tribes generally. The Professor's remarks have influenced how this author views the current
situation facing the GTB.
485. Id.
486. Id.
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involvement in deciding disputes.' ° Some states have entered cooperative
agreements that are not court ordered."9 For example, the State of
Minnesota and the Grand Portage Band of Chippewa negotiated an
agreement that provided for recognition of tribal fishing rights, limitations
on harvest levels, and tribal regulation of netting, state stocking of fish, and
state training of tribal conservation officers."9  Two co-management
agreements in the Pacific Northwest, the Columbia River Intertribal Fish
Commission (CRITFC) and the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission
(NWIFC), have been lauded as "model[s] for the nation."'93 Agreements
that are not court ordered truly reflect that each party recognizes the others
sovereignty.
Several obstacles may stand in the way of a non-court-ordered year 2000
agreement or any year 2000 agreement at all. First, Indians can agree to
restrictions that go beyond what is needed for the conservation of the
species. However, the state and sports fishing groups need to be cognizant
that if the agreement is terminated or breached, the Indians are no longer
obligated to be regulated for reasons other than "conservation" and "public
safety." The GTB argues that the current restrictions in the 1985 Agreement
go beyond "conservation and safety" restrictions. The lack of willingness
to accommodate the GTB and to make modest fishing opportunities
available to them has jeopardized GTB's inclinations to negotiate."" As
GTB already threatened, any short term victory gained by the State and its
constituent sport fishermen in the current controversies is "not conducive to
the [MIDNR Director's announced goal of negotiating a new agreement."'95
If the GTB does agree to negotiate, its resolve has been toughened and
there probably won't be an agreement unless it contains at a minimum a
50% allocation of all fish harvest, more gill net opportunities, more grounds
open to Indian fishing, more self-regulation, and a closer nexus between any
restrictions in the agreement to conservation or public safety concerns.'
Lack of continuity in State personnel dealing with Indian issues, also
causes concerns to GTB.' After reaching an understanding with State
negotiators and the head of the state agency, the MDNR personnel changed
and new people with different political motivations come on board, who
were unfamiliar with the history of the negotiations and the import of the
490. See supra notes 341-60 and accompanying text notes.
491. GE CHES Er AL., supra note 75, at 859.
492. Id.
493. Wilkinson, supra note 167, at 406.







terms of the 1985 Agreement.490 This lack of continuity causes the GTB
to distrust the state and its commitment to the agreement."'
The tribes want to define the issues to be discussed for the year 2000
agreement. One of these issues, inland hunting and fishing, is very
controversial." The MDNR director has indicated that "he's not anxious
to deal with inland hunting and fishing issues, even though the tribes say
their members do not need state licenses."' If events force the issue, it
will likely have to be resolved in a court and could even go to the U.S.
Supreme Court.""s The director stated that the State's position and the
position of the public it represents is that the Indian's have no treaty
reserved right to inland hunting and fishing."0 3 Conversely, the Indians
insist that these rights do exist and fully expect that the issue will go to
court as "[t]hey [State officials] haven't seemed willing to concede anything
unless the court tells them to.""04 The GTB in 1996 developed its own
regulations and issued inland off-reservation fishing and hunting licenses to
its members.5" The State responded by threatening to arrest tribal
members hunting and fishing off-reservation without state licenses. 6 One
year later the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians in Manistee (LRB) and
the Little Traverse Bay Band of Ottawa Indians in Harbor Springs (LTB)
threatened to issue their own hunting and fishing permits for the Great
Lakes and inland areas.' °
The MDNR director, feeling forced to deal with the issue and hoping to
resolve it in time to give guidance to the year 2000 negotiations, wrote a
letter to the tribes "suggesting that it was time for the tribes and the state
to seek a court ruling on the inland hunting and fishing issue." '
The State and public are concerned that this push to expand treaty rights
may expand beyond inland fishing and hunting to exploitation of other
natural resources, such as off-reservation logging. LCO III and LCO IV
498. See id.
499. See id.
500. Diane Conners, Cool: New Fishing Agreement Coming, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD




504. Diane Conners, Manistee Tribe Stirs Up More Fishing Debates, TRAVERSE CITY
RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Aug. 22, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Tribe Stirs Up More
Fishing Debate].
505. Diane Conners, Tribe Challenges State with Issuance of Own Hunting, Fishing Licenses,
TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Oct. 20, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Tribe
Challenges State].
506. Id.; Diane Conners, DNR: Tribal Hunters Without State License Face Arrest, TRAVERSE
CrTY RECORD EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Nov. 11, 1996, at Al.
507. Tribe Stirs Up More Fishing Debate, supra note 504, at Al.
508. Id.
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recognized Indian inland off-reservation usufructuary rights to take and
gather fish, wildlife, and vegetation and the tribal right to self regulate."a
The state could only regulate for conservation and public safety. t The
Indians however, had not reserved the right to log, but had reserved the
right to gather forest products such as firewood, tree bark, and maple
sap."' It is unlikely that a court would hold that the Ottawas and
Chippewas in Michigan had not reserved these inland rights as it is
documented that they historically dispersed inland in the winter to hunt and
fish."' The right to fish until the land is required for "settlement"
language in the Treaty of 1836 should not be a deterrent to Indian inland
fishing rights. There is considerable unsettled land in Michigan, and the
courts have shown more willingness to rely on other court decisions
granting such rights then on interpreting this language to the prejudice of
the Indians.
The LRB and LTB add a new dimension to the controversy, in that they
are two tribes in Michigan not federally recognized until 1994.' Contrary
to the State's position, LTB asserts that it is not subject to the 1985
Agreement as it was not a signatory to that agreement. 4 What this means
for year 2000 is that instead of seven parties who must agree there will be
nine parties (State of Michigan, United States, five tribes, and two litigating
amici). This tendency to lump all the tribes together may make the process
so unwieldy that no agreement would be forthcoming. Forcing tribes to
enter into agreements with provisions not affecting them and requiring tribes
to compromise for the sake of agreement of all parties on provisions
specifically affecting them may only be setting the stage for future
controversy from the onset of the agreement. On the other hand, tribes may
prefer to require the State to negotiate with them in bulk as they will be
more of a force to reckon with.
Finaly, allowing the litigating amici, sport fishing groups, a role in the
year 2000 negotiating process presents another obstacle to reaching any
agreement.515 This hybrid, somewhere between a party and amici, adds to
the complexity to negotiations. These sport fishing groups were originally
denied intervenor status by the United States district court, are technically
509. LCO 111, 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1435 (W.D. Wis. 1987); LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1241
(W.D. Wis. 1987).
510. LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1239.
511. LCO VIII, 775 F. Supp. 321, 322 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
512. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 217, 222 (W.D. Mich. 1979); CAxrON,
supra note 456, at 37.
513. LCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1239.
514. Id.
515. 1985 Agreement supra note 341, at 3 (explaining that sport fishing groups sought to
intervene in a 1983 motion by the tribes requesting allocation and the district court allowed them




already represented by the State, and should be relegated solely to advising
the court as amici 1 6 They should not, as they have now, some right of
approval over any year 2000 agreement. By granting them special status it
makes it more difficult for the State to make decisions that would be in the
best interest of all the citizens of the state.
In order to properly assess Indian fishing rights issues, "people must
engage their minds in a fixed way on the experience of the Chippewa ....
[A]n understanding of a people and their social, legal and economic
experience should be reached because it is the essential basis for devising
wise policy and for assessing how the rule of law should operate." '517 To
gain this understanding both the history of the Indians and case law
regarding Indian fishing rights must be studied. The 1985 Agreement
between the tribes and the State of Michigan established an Information and
Education Committee for the purpose of educating the public about the
agreement and promoting the understanding of treaty rights and
responsibilities. 8 This provision needs to be resorted to in the fullest
extent possible, as it is clear that in Northern Michigan there is considerable
"illiteracy" regarding Indian fishing rights. "Illiteracy" only fuels the
controversy. 19 A solution will only be forthcoming if "literate" "Indian
and non-Indian people ... create it together."5"
VIII. Conclusion
"Tribal nations are currently in a period of intense cultural and spiritual
rebirth."52' For this reason tribal fishing rights are very important to
Indians. In order to understand the current controversy in Michigan over
these rights non-Indians must begin with a basic understanding of the source
of those rights: treaties, aboriginal title, and agreements. Numerous court
decisions have interpreted treaty language and relied on prior case law to
determine that the right to engage in subsistence and commercial fishing
exist both on and off the reservation. When the resource becomes scarce,
courts have allocated the harvest to approximately 50% to Indians, 50% to
non-Indians or to an amount that will provide the Indians with a moderate
living. Tribal right to regulate treaty fishing has been acknowledged, limited
516. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 204.
517. Wilkinson, supra note 167, at 379-80.
518. 1985 Agreement supra note 341, at 16;"see also Nelson, supra note 174, at 415
(describing the State of Wisconsin's regional committees established to promote cultural
understanding); To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING
RIGHTS, supra note 107, at 705 (describing what can be done to become educated about Indian
fishing rights).
519. Our Opinion, supra note 362, at El 1.
520. To FISH IN COMMON, supra note 107, reprinted in 4 HEARING ON FISHING RIGHTS,
supra note 107, at 705.
521. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 194 (1995).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
only by the states' right to regulate for conservation of the resource or
public safety.
Respecting a tribe's right to regulate fishing is important to the tribe in
that it acknowledges the tribe as a sovereign. Most important in this era of
self-determination, "Indians want clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of
the right of self-government."5 When sport fishermen, jealous of the
Indians' "superior fishing rights," denigrate the treaties, they would diminish
Indian rights, and diminish the way of Indian people. Sport fishermen are
a very organized, vocal, and active group. Tirelessly, they continue to bring
the same time worn arguments in an attempt to eliminate treaty fishing
rights. Despite the fact that all of their arguments have been decided by a
long line of court cases, they still manage to incite others and gain
sympathy from legislators.5"
Rather than supporting the sport .fishermen's cause, the State and
legislators should engage in a campaign of education. Literate citizens
would support government-to-government agreements. There will be less
need for a "judicial fish master" and each party will have more control if
the agreement can be reached without court intervention.
As the debate in Michigan intensifies, the more difficult it may be to
negotiate a year 2000 agreement. Yet such an agreement is necessary to
still the violence and social unrest."s
522. KICKINGBIRD, supra note 27, at 46.
523. Rich Wertz, Leelanau Officials Probe Shooting Incidents, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD
EAGLE (Traverse City, Mich.), Jan. 23, 1996, at Al. A recent example of violence occurred in
1996 when non-Indians shot at an Indian fisherman over his use of the municipal marina. Id. It
required a court ruling to establish that tribal fishermen have the right to use the marina. Id.
524. Response of Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Inc., Litigating Amicus, in
Opposition to Grand Traverse Band's Motion Requesting Modification of the 1985 Consent Order,
Including Its Information Filing Under the Court's Dispute Resolution Mechanism at 5, United
States v. Michigan, No. 2:73 CV-26 (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 12, 1997). This patronizing response
to GTB motion blames the tribe for advancing its own agenda to expand salmon fishing, extend
fishing grounds inland, regulate tribal fishing, and to expand gill netting. Id. at 6. It accuses the
tribe of being "strident and defiant" and of jeopardizing the- "spirit of cooperation" behind the
1985 agreement. Id. at 5. Finally it accuses GTB of risking violence and social unrest by
pursuing its motion. Id. This response seems to imply that GTB can only blame itself if anything
bad happens from pursuing rights granted to tribal members by the treaties.
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